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RATIONAL RETROACTIVITY IN A COMMERCIAL CONTEXT 
David Frisch• 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following hypothetical: 1 A driver parks and leaves her car 
in a public space where there is no parking meter in which coins must be 
deposited or any sign prohibiting or placing restrictions on parking. When 
the driver later returns to her car, however, she discovers that a meter has 
been installed during her absence, and a parking ticket is now lodged be-
tween her wiper and windshield. Should the driver be required to pay?2 In 
such circumstances, the easy answer is no. But why not? What barriers, if 
any, should there be to governmental efforts at enforcing the ticket against 
the unsuspecting citizen? 
Quite apart from any potential constitutional issues,3 we might be 
tempted to say more generally that there is something fundamentally unfair 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. B.S., University of Pennsylvania; 
J .D., University of Miami School of Law; L.L.M., Yale Law School. I thank my research assistant at the 
University of Richmond School of Law, James Olmsted, for valuable contributions to this Article and 
Jane Kendall for her editorial assistance. 
1. My "hypothetical" is not entirely hypothetical. See Meters & Tickets Appear, RICH. TIMES 
DISPATCH, June 22, 2005, at A2. 
2. The hypothetical and discussion in the text implicitly assume that the meter was installed for the 
first time after the car was parked. In actuality, the meter had been temporarily removed during construc-
tion, and when it was replaced, the car was ticketed. This difference is of little importance to the driver, 
who in either case, would have been acting on the reasonable belief that she was permitted to park where 
she did without having to pay. Thus, if either a new law is retroactively applied to past conduct or an 
existing law, which is effectively impossible to discover, is prospectively applied, individuals may be 
affected in a troublesome way. Fortunately for the driver in this case, the city's revenue department 
decided not to enforce the parking ticket. 
3. There are express provisions in the Federal Constitution against retroactive laws. Both Congress 
and the states are prohibited from passing ex post facto laws or bills of attainder, see U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§§ 9-10, and the states may not pass laws which impair the obligation of contract, see id. § IO. Similar 
prohibitions can also be found in the constitutions of several states. See generally Comment, Campbell v. 
Holt-A Rule or an Exception?, 35 YALE L.J. 478, 482 n.16 (1926). Moreover, the historical policy 
against retroactivity has occasionally found expression in the due process clauses of the federal and state 
constitutions. See Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TEX. L. REV. 231, 237 (1927) 
("[l]t is the custom now for courts to stay within the constitution and, in the absence of an express prohi-
bition of retroactive laws, to apply the due process clause."). Notwithstanding the protection afforded by 
the federal and state constitutions against retroactive legislation, no court has ever held that the protec-
tion is absolute. See 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION§ 41.05, at 368 
(5th ed. 1992) ("Even where a constitution explicitly and unqualifiedly prohibits the enactment of retro-
spective statutes, the courts usually strike down only those statutes whose retroactivity results in measur-
able unfairness."). Although a detailed discussion of the constitutional dimension to the subject of retro-
activity is beyond the scope of this Article, it may be assumed that none of the suggestions offered 
herein would be constitutionally impermissible. 
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about government altering the rules that govern past conduct. The reason for 
the traditional disrepute in which retroactively applicable laws have been 
held comes through quite clearly in the following set of propositions: 
(1) Individuals commonly act so as to achieve advantageous results. 
(2) Retroactive laws change the legal results of acts after these acts 
have been performed. 
(3) Therefore retroactive laws defeat reasonable expectations and 
are undesirable.4 
It should therefore come as no surprise that familiar objections to retroactive 
legislation have been part and parcel of the American lawmaking process.5 
Just some of the pejorative epithets used to denounce retroactive lawmaking 
include, "a violation of fundamental principles," "repugnant to the common 
principles of justice and civil liberty," against "natural right," and contrary 
to "the principles of generaljurisprudence."6 
An important caveat should perhaps be interposed here. It is worth not-
ing that the historical antipathy towards the retroactive application of legis-
lation should be distinguished from the traditional norm of applying com-
mon law decisions retroactively.7 For example, such an approach has long 
characterized the evolution of tort doctrine. 8 When a court overrules a 
precedent or provides a new, more expansive interpretation of existing tort 
law, the decision reaches back as far as the applicable statute of limitations 
allows. This is a striking feature of the notion-now seemingly debunked-
that courts do not make law but merely engage in the practice of finding or 
interpreting the law.9 In any case, there can be little doubt that the retroac-
4. W. David Slawson, Constitutional and Legislative Considerations in Retroactive Lawmaking, 
48 CAL. L. REV. 216, 219 (1960). 
5. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES§ 1398, 
at 272 (5th ed. 1891) ("Retrospective laws are, indeed, generally unjust; and, as has been forcibly said, 
neither accord with sound legislation, nor with the fundamental principles of the social compact."). See 
generally Ray H. Greenblatt, Judicial Limitations on Retroactive Civil Legislation, 51 Nw. U. L. REV. 
540, 540-44 (1957) (discussing the history of the bias against retroactive legislation). 
6. Smith, supra note 3, at 237 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
7. See Jill E. Fisch, The Implications of Transition Theory for Stare Decisis, 13 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL ISSUES 93, 98 (2003) ("When a court overrules a precedent, the new legal rule is applied retroac-
tively to all pending and future cases .... In contrast, statutory changes and constitutional amendments 
generally apply prospectively."). Slawson offers a possible explanation positing that, unlike legislation, 
"[j]udicial rule-making is the product of reasoning from generally accepted premises, not fiat, and there-
fore its course may be predicted with some confidence." Slawson, supra note 4, at 245. 
8. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 
598-602 (1986); Gary T. Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 796, 816-18 (1983). 
9. Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, Rational Expectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J. CONTEMP. 
LEGAL lsSUES 211, 240 n.60 (2003) ("It is sometimes suggested that the prevailing norm of applying 
common law decision[s] retroactively stems from the pre-realist traditional understanding of the role of 
common law courts as finding or interpreting the law rather than making it."). Today, no one would 
seriously doubt that courts do, indeed, make law and that this lawmaking function beneficially permits 
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tive application of judicial lawmaking, like legislative lawmaking, can pro-
foundly alter the legal status of prior actions for better or worse. 10 This is 
conspicuously so when rules change so abruptly as to surprise or confuse 
the regulated parties. We might readily imagine, for example, that a deci-
sion to permit innocent victims of crime who are injured by the use of a 
firearm to recover damages from firearm manufacturers would substantially 
affect the profitability of these firms, regardless of the source of the law 
change. Holding to a false distinction between judicial and legislative law in 
the discussion of retroactivity may therefore unnecessarily cloud the issue. 11 
Our simplified parking meter example is an amusing case of recent vin-
tage in which it seems obviously unjust to fine individuals for past behavior 
made impermissible later under a new directive. Yet retroactive legal 
change, a common and unavoidable everyday occurrence, does not always 
produce results so clearly undesirable or unfair. Courts and legislatures alike 
must constantly respond to the pervasive problem of changed circum-
stances. Because social needs and mores evolve over time, legal principles 
should and must change as well. New developments involving technological 
capacity, economics, or even the international situation may give rise to 
legal obsolescence. In these circumstances, statutory change is a valuable 
corrective. Moreover, although courts should generally follow precedent in 
the interests of stability, 12 wrong or outdated decisions ultimately should not 
stand in the way of "better" law. 13 In short: Legal change is both necessary 
and inevitable. 14 
the common law to evolve so as to correct for a world of changing conditions. See, e.g., S. Pac. Co. v. 
Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (observing that "judges do and must legis-
late"); Jabez Fox, Law and Fact, 12 HARV. L. REV. 545, 548 (1899) (recognizing that judicial legislation 
"is inherent in the strict performance of judicial duty"); Philip B. Kurland, Jurisdiction of the United 
States Supreme Court: Time fora Change?, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 616, 618 (1974) (observing that the 
ability of courts to make law "is the genius of the common law system that we inherited from our Eng-
lish forbears"). 
10. See BORIS I. BITIKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME: ESTATES AND GIFTS 'JI 3.3.4, at 3-28 
.(1981) (noting that "expectations can be upset by judicial decisions and administrative rulings as well as 
by legislative action"). 
11. See Bryant Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights II, 6 TEx. L. REV. 409, 414-15 (1928) 
(''The distinction between retroactive laws made by the courts and those made by the legislatures, is a 
distinction of practicability and not a distinction of justice. That the one should provoke judicial epithets 
while the other is taken for granted, would indicate that the consideration of the subject has been senti-
mental rather than scientific."). 
12. Predictability is the most common justification for adhering to precedent. See David Lyons, 
Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 V AND. L. REV. 495, 496 (1985) (''The reason most often 
given for the practice of precedent is that it increases the predictability of judicial decisions."); Earl 
Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367, 368 (1988) (''The most commonly heard justifica-
tion for the doctrine of stare decisis rests on the need for certainty in the law."). Without predictability, 
individuals would be unable to plan their affairs-business or otherwise-without taking an undue risk. 
See Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 281, 286 (1990) 
(noting that predictability of outcome "is especially important in cases involving property rights and 
commercial transactions"). 
13. One implicit assumption in this Article and in the theoretical work of contemporary commenta-
tors is that the particular change in the law-whether common law or statutory-actually improves the 
law when judged by an appropriate normative objective. Yet it may sometimes tum out that the opposite 
is true. See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text. 
14. As Richard Epstein comments: 
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Consider the process of periodic adjustments to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code (U.C.C. or the Code) to adapt the Code to fundamental changes in 
society. Within the past twenty years, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.) and the American Law Insti-
tute (A.L.I.) have drafted initially or revised every substantive article of the 
Code.15 Although the particular impetus for the drafting projects has varied 
somewhat from one to the next, the basic objective throughout has been to 
prevent the Code from becoming outdated. Moreover, even those basic fea-
tures of commercial activity that have not themselves changed dramatically 
over the years may now operate in a radically different environment. For 
example, the core content of Article 2 (Sales) has remained largely un-
changed since the promulgation of the 1957 Official Text of the Code. The 
same cannot be said, however, of commercial and consumer law generally 
or of the technological environment in which many transactions now take 
place. Some of the more obvious changes include the common law devel-
opment of a theory of strict products liability that overlaps the Code, the 
enactment of federal and state consumer protection legislation, and the 
growing use of electronic methods of contracting. 16 In addition to these ef-
forts to keep the Code responsive to contemporary needs, legislatures have 
enacted auxiliary statutes covering limited subjects which have not been 
consolidated into the Code.17 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising that academic interest in tran-
sition policy, broadly defined, has deepened in recent years. 18 If one accepts 
Louis Kaplow's view that a transition issue arises "whenever actors make 
decisions whose effects may be influenced by government policies that are 
not known with certainty at the time the decisions are made,"19 transition 
Transitions are not only fixed features of our everyday lives. They are also fixed features of 
our legal and social environment. It goes without saying that the pressures of social and tech-
nological: the plow often cry out for readjustments in legal policy. In some instances, it is 
necessary to correct previous mistakes in policy. In other cases, it is necessary to adapt old 
legal rules to new technologies farming, the printing press, the railroad, the radio or the Inter-
net. We, therefore, witness a constant procession of incremental changes through the com-
mon law, and larger systematic changes through regulation, taxation and the modification of 
liability rules. 
Richard A. Epstein, Beware of Legal Transitions: A Presumptive Vote for the Reliance Interest, 13 J. 
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 69 (2003). 
15. See U.C.C. Articles I (2001), 2 (2003), 2A (2003 J, 3 (2002), 4 (2002), 4A (1989), 5 (1995), 6 
(1989), 7 (2004), 8 (1994), and 9 (2001). See U.C.C. advisory panel preface, at III. 
16. See Edith Resnick Warkentine, Anicle 2 Revisions: An Opponunity to Protect Consumers and 
"Merchant/Consumers" Through Default Provisions, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 39, 78 (1996). 
17. For example, recognizing that inappropriate law could hinder the development of electronic 
commerce and that the impact of new technologies extends beyond the scope of the Code to other types 
of transactions, N.C.C.U.S.L. completed the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in 1999. See Uniform 
Law Commissioners, Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact 
_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ueta.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2007). 
18. Important writings on transition issues include: DANIEL SHAVIRO, WHEN RULES CHANGE: AN 
EcONOMIC AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND RETROACTIVITY (2000); Michael J. 
Graetz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47 
(1977); Kaplow, supra note 8; Saul Levmore, Changes, Anticipations, and Reparations, 99 Cot.UM. L. 
REV. 1657 (1999). 
19. Louis Kaplow, Transition Policy: A Conceptual Framework, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
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policy is a matter of universal importance that is not limited solely to cases 
in which a new law alters the legal status of past conduct20 but is inclusive 
of all situations in which there is a risk that the future consequences of pre-
sent conduct might be altered in some unknown way by a change in gov-
ernment policy.21 In this sense, transition issues are ubiquitous. We live in a 
world of legal change, and our actions frequently have consequences that 
extend into the future.22 Kaplow illustrates the pervasiveness of transition 
issues by using the example of a thirty-year municipal bond.23 When origi-
nally purchased by the bondholder, the interest is tax exempt. Five years 
later, Congress repeals the exemption. Even if the repeal is nominally pro-
spective (i.e., the taxpayer is allowed to retain the benefits of the exemption 
that operated for the first five years of ownership), the repeal would cost the 
bondholder the value of the tax exemption for the remaining twenty-five 
years, a cost not anticipated at the time of purchase. Thus all investment 
activity, the value of which depends on what occurs in the future, implicates 
issues of transition policy.24 
Transition policy concerns about the desirability and legitimacy of ap-
plying new rules to past behavior, moreover, are inseparable from consid-
161, 165 (2003). 
20. See Stephen R. Munzer, Retroactive Laws, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 373 (1977) (defining a law as 
"retroactive if it alters the legal status of acts that were performed before it came into existence"); see 
also Charles B. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 692, 692 (1960) (offering the definition that a "retroactive statute is one which reaches 
back to attach new legal rights and duties to already completed transactions"). 
21. Michael Graetz constructs a similar model of retroactivity. See Graetz, supra note 18, at 49 
("For purposes of analysis it is essential to recognize the similarity in impact between a change which is 
nominally retroactive, and affects the value of transactions that occurred in the past, and one which is 
nominally prospective, but also has an effect on the value of past transactions."). 
22. David Slawson, for example, believes that it is a mistake to assume 
that an act, once done, achieves its legal results instantaneously and full-blown. In fact, this is 
rarely the case, especially in property and contract transactions. A purchaser of property ob-
tains a cluster of legal relations which project indefinitely into the future. A party to a con-
tract does likewise. And all kinds of less formal relationships are entered, modified, or termi-
nated with a view of both the present and future legal consequences of such action. 
Slawson, supra note 4, at 219. This same observation, but with even more force, has been made by 
Frederick Schauer. See Frederick Schauer, Legal Development and the Problem of Systemic Transition, 
13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL lsSUES 261 (2003). Schauer states: 
[I]t is not implausible to suggest that the problem of legal transition is the problem not only 
of all of law, but also of all of life, for few actions are devoid of future consequences, and few 
forms of behavior can be known with certainty to be immune from possible future legal 
change. 
Id. at 263. 
23. See Kaplow, supra note 8, at 516. The bond hypothetical was also earlier suggested by Graetz. 
See Graetz, supra note 18, at 57-58. 
24. This is what Schauer means when he says: 
Under this capacious conception of a transition issue, a transition issue arises whenever I pur-
chase an asset which on resale might (or might not be) taxed in some way, whenever I ac-
quire property whose ownership might (or might not be) unlawful at some point in its now-
predicted useful life, whenever I commit to an enterprise that might (or might not) in the fu-
ture be more (or less) regulated than it is now, and in general whenever I engage in an ex-
tended or consequential activity whose duration or whose consequences extend across a pos-
sible period of legal change. 
Schauer, supra note 22, at 263. 
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erations of mechanisms that might be employed to mitigate gains and losses 
experienced by those who acted in reliance on laws no longer in effect.25 
The menu of transition policy choices ranges from no relief whatsoever to 
options such as partial or delayed implementation, grandfathering, compen-
sation, and taxation.26 In recent years, for example, several scholars have 
propounded the notion that there should be no transition relief following a 
rule change that is itself beneficial.27 According to this view, the norm of 
choice should generally be one of pro-retroactivity, identical to the norm 
that governs judicially adopted legal changes. In a nutshell, these scholars 
maintain that the retroactive application of new legal rules without transi-
tion relief hastens their implementation, increases the ex ante incentive of 
private parties to efficiently anticipate beneficial legal changes, and thus 
encourages socially desirable behavior.28 The risk of uncompensated transi-
tion losses may be mitigated by self-insurance or through a system of com-
mercial insurance that would likely develop.29 
To this point, the discussion has not differentiated among the various 
contexts in which transition issues are presented. Although, as has been 
noted, such issues can arise whenever the government acts, scholars have 
tended to confine their discussions to three specific contexts: taxation, tort 
liability, and government takings. But the same concerns and effects are not 
presented in all contexts. In choosing either to favor or disfavor the norm of 
retroactivity, one must determine the optimal background condition consid-
ering several factors. For example, if the application of a retroactivity norm 
is efficient because it creates the right incentives in a particular context, the 
converse might be true when, in a different context, the incentive effect 
would be nonexistent or negligible. 
This Article focuses on the commercial law context. While transition is-
sues have previously received scant attention,30 this area of the law is pro-
ceeding at an accelerating rate,31 making transition policy crucially impor-
tant at this time. In particular, this Article will consider the plausibility and 
implications of a retroactivity norm in the commercial law context by exam-
25. It is important to note that legal change creates winners as well as losers. See Kaplow, supra 
note 19, at 167 ("[T]ransition gains are as ubiquitous as transition losses and to a substantial extent call 
for symmetric analysis."). 
26. For a brief overview of these transition mechanisms, see Kaplow, supra note 19, at 186-90. 
27. The classic work that takes such a position is Kaplow, supra note 8, at 516. But Kaplow's 
analysis was, in fact, spurred by the earlier effort of Graetz. See Graetz, supra note 18; see also 
SHAVIRO, supra note 18; Levmore, supra note 18, at 1658 n.2. 
28. Levmore refers to this new view of transition policy as "anticipation-oriented." The old view, 
which tended toward a bias against retroactivity, he calls "reliance-oriented." Levmore, supra note 18, at 
1658-59. For more on the "new" view, see infra notes 34-53 and accompanying text. 
29. See Kaplow, supra note 8, at 520-66. The norm of retroactivity assumes, however, that markets 
are perfect and therefore risks and incentives can be efficiently addressed. However, given the possibility 
of failures in the insurance market, such as moral hazard problems and transaction costs, government 
mitigation of transition losses may be appropriate. See id. at 536-50. 
30. One exception is U.C.C. Article 9. Given its nature, it should come as no surprise that concur-
rent with each substantial revision, consideration was given to transition issues. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-701 
to -709 (2005); infra notes 130-137 and accompanying text. 
31. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. 
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ining the recent revisions and amendments to Articles 1 and 2 of the Code. 
Two claims will be advanced: The incentive-based analysis of retroactivity 
issues in other contexts does not necessarily comport with the realities of 
commercial law, and consideration of both expectations and incentives 
demonstrates that commercial law is more amenable to a rule-by-rule appli-
cation of the retroactivity norm. Part I will briefly examine the consequen-
tialist framework that undergirds modern attempts to deal with the problems 
of legal transitions and will explain why this approach is insufficient to 
shape a universal norm regarding the retroactivity of commercial law re-
form.32 
The discussion will demonstrate why an incentive-based analysis is sub-
ject to particular criticism with respect to certain subsets of commercial law 
rules, without attempting to evaluate the overall merits of the "new" view. 
Part II will describe in summary form judicial decisions that have filled the 
voids left by legislation silent as to transition matters. It will also describe 
the ways in which the drafters of the Code have, over the years, responded 
to the problem of retroactivity. Part ill will first recount the traditional reli-
ance- or expectations-based33 rationale for transition policy. It will then 
examine and explain, within the context of U.C.C. Articles 1 and 2, when 
parties would rationally and predictably rely on the law and when they 
would not, as a means of demonstrating why reliance-based policy may at 
times be undesirable in commercial law contexts. It will then put forth a 
proposed framework for determining the retroactive applicability of com-
mercial law changes. Finally, Part N will test the soundness of the pro-
posed framework by applying it to four examples of official changes in the 
Code, in order to conclude that specific outcomes should dictate when 
changes in commercial law should be applied retroactively and when they 
should not. This approach is what this Article refers to as "rational retroac-
tivity." 
I. THE NEW VIEW OF RETROACTIVITY AND ITS QUESTIONABLE 
APPLICATION To COMMERCIAL LAW CHANGES 
Economic theorists have made considerable progress in explaining why 
there should be a policy of no relief for losses occasioned by unexpected 
legal change. Many have concluded that there should be such a policy 
across the board. To summarize briefly the substantial literature, the advan-
tage of a clear norm of pro-retroactivity is that it induces rational actors to 
invest and/or to insure in a way that maximizes social welfare. The central 
idea can be illustrated by considering the following three cases: 
32. See Logue, supra note 9, at 216 n.5 (observing that the form of consequentialism that dominates 
normative law and economics scholarship, called "welfarism," evaluates alternative public policies on 
the basis of their ability to maximize social welfare). 
33. This Article uses the terms "reliance" and "expectations" interchangeably. That is, if we say that 
a person has relied on a law (i.e., made a decision based on that law), then there will be an expectation 
that the legal consequences that follow from that decision will be as anticipated. 
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Case 1. Smith decided to invest in a plant producing aerosol cans at 
a time when science suggested only a modest probability that they 
would be environmentally dangerous. As scientific investigation 
proceeded, the government came to realize that the risk of environ-
mental damage to the ozone layer dramatically exceeded any bene-
fit consumers would derive from aerosol cans and banned them, 
without compensating Smith.34 
Case 2. Jones decided to build an office building at a time when it 
seemed that there was only a modest probability that the govern-
ment would decide it needed this parcel of land, along with many 
other contiguous parcels, to build an airport. Later, however, a 
study showed that this area would be ideal for an airport, so the 
government condemned the land, tore down the buildings, and built 
an airport that constituted the highest and best use for the land. It 
did not compensate Jones for his investment in the office building.35 
Case 3. In 1986, section 2057 of the Internal Revenue Code granted 
an estate tax deduction for half the proceeds of "any sale of em-
ployer securities by the executor of an estate" to "an employee 
stock ownership plan" (ESOP). Carlton, as executor, used estate 
funds to purchase shares of MCI Communications for $11,206,000 
and then resold them two days later to the MCI ESOP for 
$10,575,000. Notwithstanding an economic loss of $631,000, Carl-
ton claimed a deduction of $5,287,000. In 1987, after the transac-
tion had been completed, section 2057 was retroactively amended 
to allow the deduction only for estates of decedents who owned the 
securities in question immediately before the death of the dece-
dent. 36 
As to Case 1, the aerosol cans investor, the "welfarist" or "consequen-
tialist" rationale might proceed like this: Companies have an informational 
advantage regarding the safety of the products they produce and should be 
aware of the risk that government regulators may step in to protect consum-
ers by changing the law.37 If the government has committed in advance to a 
clear policy of retroactivity without compensation, then, logically, the ra-
tional Smiths of this world would shelve their dangerous products today in 
34. This example is borrowed from Christopher T. Wonnell, The Noncompensation Thesis and its 
Critics: A Review of this Symposium's Challenges to the Argument for Not Compensating Victims of 
Legal Transitions, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293, 293 (2003). 
35. Id. at 293-94. 
36. Case 3 restates the basic facts of United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1994), where the 
Supreme Court held that the 1987 amendment's retroactive application to Carlton's 1986 transaction did 
not violate due process. 
37. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 18, at 1671 (suggesting that because tobacco companies have an 
informational advantage over regulators, "their anticipation of legal change is therefore to be encour-
aged"). 
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order to avoid liability tomorrow when the new rules take effect.38 Forcing 
manufacturers to anticipate beneficial rule changes compounds the effi-
ciency of new rules by causing an internalization of costs both ex ante and 
ex post with the likely outcome of safety maximization. 
Given the limitations that might be expected to confront manufacturers 
who would be forced to try to discern future government action, under this 
rationale, a fairness issue arises as to whether it is really appropriate to ap-
ply new rules that the parties could not have foreseen or anticipated. The 
consequentialists' response to such fairness objections has been sophisti-
cated indifference on the basis that the future is always uncertain. In their 
view, legal uncertainty is no different from any other form of uncertainty 
that might affect the success or failure of a business. For example, among 
the market risks that might beset the typical business are problems "con-
cerning how well a product will sell, how soon competitors will imitate in-
novations, or how much necessary inputs will cost in the future."39 To the 
consequentialists, it is not the form of risk that matters; rather, in all cases, 
risk must be confronted and dealt with by investors and managers in the 
most economically efficient way. 
Consideration of Case 2, the airport taking, reveals similar efficiencies 
resulting from the application of a norm of retroactivity. Once again, the 
consequentialist view stresses the central importance of encouraging private 
actors to anticipate future government action in planning their conduct (i.e., 
the importance of producing proper incentives). If the government takes the 
land, the investment in the office building proves worthless; hence, it would 
have been socially preferable for Jones to have invested in some other en-
terprise. The analysis concedes that things might have turned out differently 
for Jones-that there was always the possibility that the government would 
not take the land-but places the onus on Jones to take both future-world 
possibilities into account when making his investment decision. After all, 
Jones would have been expected to consider the prospect that his building 
might be destroyed by other events, such as a fire or earthquake, when de-
ciding whether the investment was worthwhile. An investor who decides to 
go forward notwithstanding these risks has an economic incentive to dimin-
ish the probability or magnitude of the potential loss by purchasing private 
insurance. The anticipation-based consequentialist view rejects the notion 
that the risk of a government taking should be treated differently.40 A re-
gime that promised government compensation for the loss of Jones' s build-
ing would induce him to ignore and, therefore, not to internalize the possi-
bility that the government might decide to appropriate his property. That, in 
turn, would give rise to the "moral hazard" problem of overinvestment.41 It 
38. A rule of retroactivity can affect only the behavior of those parties who act in ex ante anticipa-
tion of ex post legal enforcement of new rules to past conduct. 
39. Kaplow, supra note 8, at 600. 
40. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 8, at 527-33. 
41. "Moral hazard" refers to the adverse incentives that arise when a person is insulated from losses. 
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is plausible to suggest, and the consequentialists do, that the only solution to 
this adverse incentive, and one that leads to an efficient level of investment, 
is to expose Jones to the full costs and benefits of his decision.42 
A similar point about the importance of producing desirable ex ante in-
centives is demonstrated in a more obvious way in Case 3, the estate tax 
example. Here, Congress's purpose in enacting section 2057 was to "create 
an 'incentive for stockholders to sell their companies to their employees 
who helped them build the company rather than liquidate, sell to outsiders 
or have the corporation redeem their shares on behalf of existing sharehold-
ers. "'43 Unfortunately, it soon became obvious that the absence of a dece-
dent-stock-ownership requirement resulted in the deduction's broad avail-
ability to virtually any estate, at an estimated loss to the government of up to 
$7 billion in anticipated revenues over a five-year period.44 Congress had 
inadvertently created a tax loophole that was quickly exploited by Carlton 
and others. Presumably, Carlton engaged in this particular purchase and sale 
transaction with full knowledge that Congress had not contemplated such a 
strategic use of section 2057.45 Thus, if taxpayers are well informed about 
tax loopholes, Case 3 is much the same as Case 1. In both, an informational 
asymmetry is being exploited. In terms of overall social welfare maximiza-
tion, in these circumstances, an almost formulaic prescription for generating 
inefficient behavior is created by failing to give new rules retroactive effect. 
In short, only if it is known that any rule change would be applied retroac-
tively might a taxpayer in Carlton's position have the ex ante incentive to 
forego the deduction and thereby minimize the loss of social welfare that 
otherwise might result from this tax law glitch.46 
This is typically the result of insurance. Justice Stevens, for example, understood the moral hazard prob-
lem inherent in the Court's decision to compensate a landowner who was denied the right to build on his 
beachfront lot. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, !070 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
("Even measured in terms of efficiency, the Court's rule is unsound. The Court today effectively estab-
lishes a form of insurance against certain changes in land-use regulations. Like other forms of insurance, 
the Court's rule creates a 'moral hazard' and inefficiencies: In the face of uncertainty about changes in 
the law, developers will overinvest, safe in the knowledge that if the law changes adversely, they will be 
entitled to compensation."). 
42. Kaplow observes: 
[T]he incentives question is in essence an application of the analysis typically used in connec-
tion with externalities. Externalities refer to costs borne by third parties. Simply put, govern-
ment compensation creates an externality that otherwise would not be present. Compensation 
shifts part of the long-run cost of private investment to the government and thus distorts an 
otherwise efficient decisionmaking process. It is socially desirable for investors to take into 
account the prospects for government reform; compensation eliminates this incentive by insu-
lating investors from an important element of downside risk. 
Kaplow, supra note 8, at 531. 
43. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31 (1994) (quoting JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH 
CONG., TAX REFORM PROPOSALS: TAX TREATMENT OF EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS (ESOPs) 
37 (Joint Comm. Print 1985)). 
44. Id. at 32. 
45. See, e.g., Richard Lavoie, Deputizing the Gunslingers: Co-opting the Tax Bar into Dissuading 
Corporate Tax Shelters, 21 VA. TAX REV. 43, 65 (2001) (noting that "[t]he typical ... tax shelter is a 
tremendously complex and convoluted transaction" and that l.R.S. agents may be poorly equipped to 
recognize them). 
46. See Logue, supra note 9, at 231-35. 
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A corollary to the consequentialist argument that risk is risk, regardless 
of its source, applies to Case 3 as well.47 This is the notion that if the gov-
ernment does not compensate for losses occasioned by other forms of mar-
ket risk, there is no compelling reason why it should compensate for so-
called government risk either.48 Taxpayers can always reduce the risk of 
retroactive tax law changes by spreading the risk among all of the invest-
ments in their portfolio. Moreover, a policy of retroactivity preserves the 
symmetry of gains and losses.49 No disgorgement of gains is required when 
a tax law change improves the investor's position by making her investment 
more valuable. Accordingly, if "winners" are permitted to retain their fortui-
tous gains, "losers" should not receive compensation for their unfortunate 
losses.so 
These three examples--0f products liability, the taking of private prop-
erty, and retroactive taxation-suggest that when legal change is socially 
beneficial, those adversely affected by the change should not be compen-
sated by the government. Each supports the precept that a regime adopting a 
norm of retroactive legal change maintains private incentives to anticipate 
changes which, in tum, induces efficient behavioral responses. 
There are, to be sure, weaknesses in the consequentialist case for retro-
acti vity. For example, some individuals may not be rational actors capable 
of fully appreciating transition risk and bringing this understanding to bear 
on their investment decisions.s1 Others may correctly calculate the likeli-
hood of change and respond but do so in ways that prove less than socially 
optimal if the law change in question is bad rather than good. s2 Despite 
these potential flaws, however, the incentive argument for retroactivity pre-
47. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. 
48. In discussing how different effective date rules regarding tax Jaw revisions affect the efficient 
allocation of resources, Graetz makes just such a point: 
The risks of a change in law do not seem necessarily different in kind nor in magnitude from 
the risks of a change in market demand or technology. A priori, it cannot be said that the lat-
ter are less random, more predictable. Absent any convincing empirical showing that the 
losses from political change are disproportionately distributed or more burdensome on pro-
ductive output than market-reflected changes, efficiency criteria seem not to require delayed 
or grandfathered effective dates. In fact, efficiency may demand that persons expect changes 
in the law. In the market context, only behavior that takes into account probabilities of 
change is treated as reasonable. Reasonable expectations in the political context may, like-
wise, consist of only those which assess some subjective probability of change in the law. 
Graetz, supra note 18, at 65-66. 
49. Kaplow, supra note 8, at 552-55. 
50. See id. at 553 (stressing that the "argument for providing transitional relief to losers, who do not 
'deserve' their losses, which are caused by 'bad luck,' also suggest that the government should 'tax' 
gainers, who do not 'deserve' their gains, which are 'fortuitous"'). 
51. See, e.g., Logue, supra note 9, at 225 (suggesting that "the same cognitive quirks that affect 
consumers' assessments of product risks, and of risks more generally, will affect individuals' guesses 
about the likelihood of legal change, the nature of the change, and the way in which transition costs and 
benefits will be handled"). 
52. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 14, at 72 (arguing that "[t]he time, expense, and uncertainty cre-
ated by the development and implementation of new legal rules should always tilt the scale in favor of 
the status quo"). 
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sents a coherent basis for reappraising the historical animus towards retroac-
tive legislation.53 
Even if we accept the validity of the incentive-based arguments for pro-
retroactivity in the cases outlined above, unique considerations arise in the 
context of commercial relationships and changes in the rules that govern 
them. One can point to features in the process of contracting and enforce-
ment, for example, that suggest strongly that the pro-retroactivity norm 
might not be suitable. Indeed, even Kaplow asserts that transition policy is 
inherently complex and that it would be wrong to claim that one transition 
policy is always more efficient than another.54 To illustrate the poor fit be-
tween a policy of consistent pro-retroactivity and legal changes in a com-
mercial context, we may distinguish three salient features of commercial 
law. 
First, much of commercial law trades on the distinction between default 
rules and immutable rules. A default rule is a term that will govern the 
rights and obligations of the parties upon the happening of a certain contin-
gency in the event that the parties have neglected to address the contingency 
specifically by contract: they fill the gaps in the parties' agreement. Because 
parties may, in the first instance, contract out of default rules, the nature and 
form of default rules are consistent with the principle of freedom of con-
tract. This principle, popular among contract theorists in the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, rests on the belief that respect for personal auton-
omy is a necessary complement to both the liberal political state and a free-
market economy55 and has been put forth as the appropriate foundational 
approach to the U.C.C.56 However, the fact that a policy in favor of freedom 
of contract might have significant instrumental value for realizing the right 
to personal autonomy and other core elements of liberalism does not neces-
sarily mean that the law recognizes and protects the parties' terms without 
restrictions. Rather, the Code designates certain types of provisions as im-
mutable, as a policy-driven brake on full autonomy. The Code's immutable 
rules bar parties to commercial transactions from obtaining outcomes that 
differ from the specified provisions of the Code by contractual agreement. 
53. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 112 (noting that "[t]he conclusions of transition theory rely heavily 
on the core assumptions of legal improvement and rational expectations"); Logue, supra note 9, at 220 
(pointing out that "a key assumption of the framework is that those private parties will make rational, 
unbiased assessments of (a) the likelihood of legal change, (b) the nature of legal change, and (c) the 
way in which the legal change will be applied to them"). 
54. See Kaplow, supra note 8, at 557 (explaining "complications in the analysis [may] call for 
different transition policies in different cases"); see also Fisch, supra note 7, at 113 (referring to the 
paradigmatic cases of tax, takings, and products liability and raising the distinct possibility "that these 
cases reflect the exception rather than the rule"). 
55. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1710, 1769 (1997) (asserting that the principle of freedom of contract is supported 
by both ''the liberal-individualistic moral ideology and the utilitarian-economic ideology"). 
56. U.C.C. § l-302(a) (2005) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided ... the effect of provi-
sions of [the Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement." Comment 1 states that 
"[s]ubsection (a) states affirmatively at the outset that freedom of contract is a principle of the Uniform 
Commercial Code .... " Id.§ 1-302 cmt. I. 
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For example, freedom of contract never meant that courts could not inter-
vene in order to protect parties from the consequences of unfortunate or 
unfair transactions. Thus, section 1-302 provides that "[t]he obligations of 
good faith, diligence, reasonableness, and care prescribed by [the Uniform 
Commercial Code] may not be disclaimed by agreement."57 Nevertheless, 
notwithstanding the inclusion of certain key immutable rules, the Code con-
sists predominantly of default rules, a characteristic that distinguishes it 
from the bodies of law from which consequentialist pro-retroactivity exam-
ples are drawn. 
The argument for unbending pro-retroactivity begins to break down if 
one recognizes that such academic paradigms typically reflect the realities 
of legal fields that consist exclusively of immutable rules.58 Few would sug-
gest, for example, that taxation and takings are areas in which there is sig-
nificant opportunity to define rights and obligations by agreement with the 
government. This is also true of products liability law in which entering into 
a sales contract providing for no seller or manufacturer liability is simply 
not a choice that consumers can make. 59 When all applicable rules are im-
mutable, the consequentialist argument-that making legal changes retroac-
tive across the board would optimize incentives so as to maximize social 
welfare-has merit. As will be seen though, the same cannot be said of 
commercial law, in which most of the applicable rules are default rules. 
An understanding of why retroactive application of commercial law 
changes might not always produce the desired incentives might begin with 
recognition of the reasons why default rules exist. One important reason is 
that defaults reduce contract formation costs by substituting a so-called hy-
pothetical bargain for a nonexistent real one. That is, if the parties have in-
tended to contract but have not agreed with respect to a term that is essential 
to a determination of their rights and duties, the default rule fills the gap in 
their contract with a term that the parties would presumably have agreed to 
57. U.C.C. § l-302(b). It should be noted, however, that this section does permit the parties to 
"determine the standards by which the performance of those obligations is to be measured if those stan-
dards are not manifestly unreasonable." Id.; see also U.C.C. § 9-602 (2001) (limiting the freedom of 
contract in the context of Article 9. Also not without restriction is freedom from contract. For example, 
U.C.C. section 4-103(b) (2002) departs from the rule that a contract between two parties cannot bind a 
third party by stating that "Federal Reserve regulations and operating circulars, clearing-house rules, and 
the like have the effect of agreements ... whether or not specifically assented to by all parties interested 
in items handled." Id.§ 4-103(b). 
58. See Kaplow, supra note 19, at 175 (noting that "[w]hen discussing legal rules, most analysts 
have in mind rules that are binding, or at least that subject violators to fines or fees that are not op-
tional"). 
59. Some commentators have found this forced feature of products liability law difficult to justify. 
See, e.g., J. Mark Ramseyer, Products Liability Through Private Ordering: Notes on a Japanese Ex-
periment, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1823 (1996). Ramseyer comments: 
Modem products liability law may be well-established, but it is notoriously hard to justify. 
Essentially, it imposes on consumer sales contracts a broad panoply of nonwaivable terms. It 
forces sellers (or manufacturers) in specified consumer sales contracts to agree to compensate 
buyers (and specified third parties) for specified damages caused by specified defects in 
specified products. Restated, it forces sellers to bundle insurance contracts with the goods 
they sell. 
Id. at 1824. 
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if the matter had been considered and negotiated.60 The parties may have 
left this gap in their contract either because the particular contingency was 
overlooked or because it was so unlikely to occur that it was more efficient 
to choose the default rule than to negotiate a term ex ante.61 The latter ex-
planation may account for contract gaps even in those cases where the de-
fault provision seems clearly to be not what the parties would have wanted. 
Hence it cannot be confidently said that the parties left gaps in their agree-
ment because of the form taken by the default provision. In other words, it 
seems likely that, regardless of the substance of the default rule, rational 
transactors might not behave differently.62 To the extent that this observa-
tion holds true, a policy of retroactivity that presumes the parties will be-
have in a manner that is consistent with the standard incentive-based model 
of transition relief fails.63 
A second feature of commercial law that may justify a transition policy 
different from that advocated within the economic literature is that, in com-
mercial transactions, two parties rather than one must anticipate legal 
change and make behavior adjustments accordingly. That is, in commercial 
law contexts, there are restraints of cognition and cost not encountered in 
the torts, tax, and takings areas.64 One of the main reasons that the paradig-
60. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1433 (1989) (stating that the default term should be "the term that the parties would have 
selected with full information and costless contracting"); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Miti-
gation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 971 (1983) 
(explaining that "the preformulated rules supplied by the state should mimic the agreements contracting 
parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out each detail of the transaction"); Alan Schwartz, 
Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 361 (1988) (stating 
that the default rule should reflect "the contract that most well-informed persons would have adopted if 
they were to bargain about the matter"). 
61. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 92-93 (1989). Specifically: 
Id. 
Contracts may be incomplete because the transaction costs of explicitly contracting for a 
given contingency are greater than the benefits. These transaction costs may include legal 
fees, negotiation costs, drafting and printing costs, the costs of researching the effects and 
probability of a contingency, and the costs to the parties and the courts of verifying whether a 
contingency occurred. Rational parties will weigh these costs against the benefits of contrac-
tually addressing a particular contingency. If either the magnitude or the probability of a con-
tingency is sufficiently low, a contract may be insensitive to that contingency even if transac-
tion costs are quite low. 
62. See id. at 93 (suggesting that "as transaction costs increase, so does the parties' willingness to 
accept a default that is not exactly what they would have contracted for"). The discussion in the text is 
not meant to suggest that contracting parties never respond to defaults. Consider the type of default rule 
that Ayres and Gertner refer to as a "penalty default." Id. at 95-101. This is a term that the parties would 
not want in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third parties. Id. The 
most conventional example of such a default is the holding in Hadley v. Baxendale, [1854] 156 Eng. 
Rep. 145 (Exch. Div.) and U.C.C. section 2-715(2)(a) (2003), that the promisor is liable for only fore-
seeable consequential damages. Thus, the promisee is given the incentive to reveal business information 
to the promisor. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 61, at 101-04. The fact that some defaults are designed to 
create incentives does not detract from the point, however, that a legal field comprised mainly of defaults 
does not fit neatly within the incentives-based model of retroactivity. 
63. See Kaplow, supra note 19, at 176 (suggesting that when it comes to defaults "determining 
appropriate transition rules reflects different concerns"). 
64. Others have made similar observations. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 115. 
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matic areas of torts and tax are well-suited to serve as poster children for the 
incentive-based model is that often the legal change responds to a perceived 
glitch in the law in a way that, at least as far as the affected parties are con-
cerned, is exceedingly blunt. To the extent a change is curative of a tax 
loophole, for example, its coming is foreseeable. Indeed, much of tax plan-
ning has been described as "planning around warts in the law."65 When the 
cure comes, the wart is removed and the loophole is simply and straightfor-
wardly closed. In the world of commercial law reform, things are seldom 
that simple. 
In commercial law contexts, even if the parties can easily anticipate a 
change, the form that the change will take may be highly uncertain. For 
example, when the Article 2 revision project began, it was arguably obvious 
to all observers that steps would be taken to provide sufficiently clear guid-
ance to courts and to ensure fair results to purchasers and licensees of com-
puter information and "smart goods" containing computer information. It 
was less obvious, though, what those steps would be and who would take 
them. Initially, N.C.C.U.S.L. and the AL.I. decided to proceed with a "hub 
and spoke" approach that would have reconfigured Article 2 into a central 
hub of general principles with parts or hubs devoted separately to the spe-
cial incidents of sales of goods on one hand and computer information 
transactions on the other.66 After considerable effort to implement this com-
plex drafting strategy failed, it was abandoned and a new drafting commit-
tee was appointed to produce a new Article 2B of the Code. This proposed 
article would have governed all contracts for the sale, licensing, develop-
ment, distribution, maintenance, documentation, and support of computer 
software; it too was eventually abandoned. In 1999, N.C.C.U.S.L. decided 
that instead of incorporating this uniform law within the Code, it would be 
more appropriate to promulgate it as a freestanding statute, to be named the 
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (U.C.l.T.A.), for adoption 
by the states.67 This was the approach ultimately taken. However, 
U.C.l.T.A. has been almost uniformly rejected by the states,68 and 
N.C.C.U.S.L. is no longer recommending its adoption.69 This means that in 
most jurisdictions, the relevant source of state law governing software 
transactions today may be the common law. 
65. David A. Weisbach, Ten Truths about Tax Shelters, 55 TAX L. REV. 215, 225 (2002). 
66. For valuable discussions of the hub and spoke idea, see Marion W. Benfield, Jr. & Peter A. 
Alces, Reinventing the Wheel, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1405 (1994) and Raymond T. Nimmer, Intangi-
bles Contracts: Thoughts of Hubs, Spokes, and Reinvigorating Article 2, 35 WM. & MARYL. REV. 1337 
(1994). 
67. For a brief history of Article 2B and the reasons why the project was transformed into 
U.C.I.T.A., see Fred H. Miller & Carlyle C. Ring, Article 2B's New Uniform: A Free-Standing Com-
puter Information Transactions Act, U.C.C. BULL, June 1999, at I, 2-4. 
68. The only states to have adopted U.C.l.T.A. are Virginia and Maryland. Mo. CODE ANN., COM. 
LAW II§ 22-101 (LexisNexis 2005); VA. CODE ANN.§ 59.1-501.1 (2006). 
69. See Daniel A. DeMarco & Christopher B. Wick, Now UC/TA, Now You Don't: A Bankruptcy 
Practitioner's Observations on the Proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, AM. 
BANKR. INST. J ., May 2004, at 34, 34. 
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Like its predecessor, amended Article 2 deals with "transactions in 
goods."70 The major change in the scope of the rules involves the definition 
of "goods," which has been amended so as to explicitly exclude "informa-
tion."71 An Official Comment explains this new exclusion by stating that 
"the sale of 'smart goods' such as an automobile is a transaction in goods 
fully within this article even though the automobile contains many computer 
programs."72 Then, in the next commentary breath, we are told that "[w]hen 
a transaction includes both the sale of goods and the transfer of rights in 
information, it is up to the courts to determine whether the transaction is 
entirely within or outside of this article, or whether or to what extent this 
article should be applied to a portion of the transaction."73 The distinction 
between pure goods and mixed goods/information transfers raises questions 
as to just what it is that makes an automobile an obvious case for total inclu-
sion within Article 2. Is it that the goods portion of the transaction predomi-
nates?74 What if the jurisdiction uses a "gravamen test" for determining the 
applicability of Article 2, and the gravamen (essence) of the action involves 
the software?75 If an automobile is an easy case, what about VCRs, DVDs, 
television sets, Palm Pilots, digital cameras, video game machines, and a 
host of kitchen appliances that now rely on software? Does the method of 
delivering software matter? For example, would software in an automobile 
still be covered by Article 2 if it were purchased separately and then 
downloaded into or electronically delivered to the automobile? If questions 
such as these are still under active debate, it seems absurd to suggest that 
parties to a software transaction in 198776 could have predicted with any 
degree of accuracy the future form and substance of the law. Thus, at least 
70. u.c.c. § 2-102 (2005). 
71. Id. § 2-103(l)(k). 
72. Id. § 2-103 cmt. 7. 
73. Id. 
74. The courts often are called upon to determine whether a particular transaction is within the 
scope of Article 2. This is frequently the case when the transaction involves both goods and non-goods 
components. Courts refer to these transactions as "mixed" or "hybrid" transactions. The "predominant 
purpose" test is the typical approach pursued by courts. If the court finds that a transaction is predomi-
nantly a sale of goods, then Article 2 is applied to the whole. For a collection of cases involving sale and 
non-sale components, see David Frisch, Fairfax Leary, Jr. & John D. Wladis, Uniform Commercial Code 
Annual Survey: General Provisions, Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 41 Bus. LAW. 1363, 
1365-68 (1986). 
75. A minority of courts will apply Article 2 to the goods aspect of the transaction and non-Code 
law to the non-goods aspect, regardless of which is the dominant factor or purpose. This is commonly 
referred to as the "gravamen" approach. Thus, if the essence (gravamen) of an action is associated with a 
transfer of rights in information, the court will apply non-Code law in deciding the case. See, e.g., Foster 
v. Colo. Radio Corp., 381 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1967). 
76. Although the task of revising Article 2 officially began in 1991 with the appointment of a draft-
ing committee under the auspices of N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I., its unofficial beginning was several 
years earlier. In 1987, Geoffrey C. Hazard, then director of the A.L.I., asked professors Charles W. 
Mooney and Richard E. Spiedel to investigate the need to update Article 2. As a result of this prelimi-
nary study, the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code (PEB), with the approval 
of N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I., appointed a "Study Group" to make recommendation as to whether 
Article 2 should be revised. The Study Group submitted a Preliminary Report in the fall of 1990, and an 
executive summary was submitted to the PEB in the spring of 1991. 
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in the commercial law context, the assumption that private parties can fully 
anticipate legal change appears unrealistic. 
Similarly, legal uncertainty can exist even when a future legal provision 
is easily foreseen. Consider the fact pattern in the well-known case of Wil-
liams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.17 The seller, the operator of a retail 
furniture store in a low income neighborhood, used a form installment sales 
contract for purchases made on credit. The form contract provided for a 
security interest in the item purchased and further provided that until the 
buyer's debt for all items purchased was fully repaid, any payments made 
would be applied pro rata over all outstanding accounts. The effect of this 
cross-collateral clause was to give the seller the right to repossess all pur-
chased items if the buyer failed to make payment at any time before the 
entire debt for all was fully paid. Let us assume that the seller was aware 
that the Code would soon become law in her jurisdiction78 and that it would 
include a codification of the concept of unconscionability.79 Assume further 
that the seller was aware that the Code, once enacted, would apply retroac-
tively to preexisting contracts. Would this knowledge necessarily have in-
duced the seller to anticipate the new law and respond by ceasing to use the 
draconian cross-collateral clause? Owing to the. nature of the legal change, it 
is not at all clear that it would have or should have this effect. 
The virtue of an open-ended standard of indefinite scope such as the 
doctrine of unconscionability is the discretion that it gives courts to decide 
cases in a manner that is sensitive to the realities of modern commercial life. 
With its textual simplicity, it aims to build a world of jurisprudence80 by 
requiring the supplement of judicial interpretation: It is only through case 
law that guidance and clarity as to what is and what is not unconscionable 
can be obtained.81 Of course, one consequence of this lawmaking delegation 
to the courts is substantial post-adoption uncertainty. Whether a contract or 
clause will be deemed unconscionable is often highly contestable and diffi-
cult to predict. It is only after a period of judicial interpretation in a variety 
of commercial contexts that the standard will take on a content that provides 
the necessary guidance to transactors.82 Certainly, where substantial post-
adoption uncertainty is to be expected, the anticipation of a legal change of 
this nature is even less likely to guide pre-adoption conduct well. The seller 
77. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
78. The Code was first adopted by the District of Columbia in 1965. Id. at 448. 
79. It was the inappropriate use of doctrines such as such as fraud, duress, and undue influence that 
led Karl Llewellyn and the drafters of Article 2 of the Code to codify for the first time the concept of 
unconscionability. 
80. See generally Robert Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 337 
(1970); John P. Dawson, Unconscionable Coercion: The German Version, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1041 
(1976); M.P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 ( 1969); Arthur Allen Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967). 
81. The Code provides that the question of unconscionability is an issue of law for the court to 
decide. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 3 (2005). 
82. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 611 
(1992) (stating that "[t]o the extent laws are promulgated as standards, predictability will be enhanced by 
precedent to the extent precedent transforms standards into rules"). 
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in the above hypothetical may or may not be later told that the cross-
collateral clause in her contracts is unconscionable.83 If the outcome is un-
predictable, the appropriateness of the seller's potential response to the an-
ticipated legal change is unpredictable as well. Thus, when an economic 
approach to transitions prescribes policy based on the incorrect assumption 
that a particular legal change can be accurately anticipated, it is likely to 
predict behavior poorly and channel policy in misguided directions. 
If the ability of a single party to anticipate and price the risk of legal 
change is sometimes questionable, the prospect of two parties doing so effi-
ciently is highly unlikely.84 The paradigm examples used in transition 
analysis may support pro-retroactivity only in the chosen contexts and oth-
ers that similarly require only one party to be properly incentivized. In both 
the software and unconscionability examples, though, the uncertainty that 
results from legal change adds to the negotiation costs associated with con-
sensual transactions by altering the context within which those negotiations 
take place. Cost is always a function of risk, and legal uncertainty that 
makes unclear the content or application of the law that will govern the par-
ties' relationship increases the risk of frustrated expectations. To reduce this 
risk to an acceptable level, the parties must develop the informational basis 
necessary for determining the likelihood that change will occur and the sub-
stance of that change. Without a cost-effective method for accomplishing 
this, certain socially beneficial projects will be abandoned.85 In this way, 
then, a policy of retroactivity in every case could unintentionally undermine 
the vitality of a well-functioning economic system. 
This brings us to a third feature of commercial law that calls into ques-
tion the wisdom of such an approach. To illustrate this feature, consider the 
recent revision of Article 9 of the U.C.C. Suppose that in 1997, prior to the 
approval of revised Article 9, a secured party extended credit to a debtor 
and received a security interest in the debtor's equipment, pursuant to a 
83. In Walker-Thomas, the court of appeals rejected the seller's argument that the unconscionability 
doctrine was inapplicable because the contracts in question were entered into prior to the enactment of 
the Code. Although the court refused to apply the Code retroactively, it held that the doctrine could be 
applied as a matter of common law. 350 F.2d at 448-49. The case was then remanded for findings on the 
issue of unconscionability. Id. at 450. In his dissent, Judge Danaher was of the opinion that because of 
many aspects of public policy involved in a case of this sort, the court should await corrective legislation 
by Congress. Id. But see In re MacDonald, 100 B.R. 714, 721 (1989) (finding that a cross-collateral 
clause was common in the industry and therefore not unconscionable). rev'd, No. Civ. A. 89-369 LON, 
1992 WL 12044050 (D. Del. Apr. 13, 1992). 
84. See Fisch, supra note 7, at 114 (suggesting that "the ability of private actors to anticipate and 
price the risk of legal change outside of torts and tax may be overstated"). 
85. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002). The 
author comments: 
The new moment of uncertainty also will translate into increased negotiation costs. For con-
sensual transactions, uncertainty about the legal infrastructure broadens the range of issues in 
need of private resolution. In so doing, a new body of law may introduce friction into the ne-
gotiation of transactions within its scope. The resultant increase in the costs of private order-
ing will make some socially desirable transactions less efficient and deter others altogether. 
Id. at 830. 
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written security agreement.86 The debtor was incorporated in Virginia, had 
plants in North Carolina, West Virginia, and Maryland, and had its corpo-
rate headquarters in North Carolina. Equipment was located at each plant. 
The secured party wishing to perfect its security interest by filing a financ-
ing statement would have looked to Article 9 for guidance as to the correct 
state(s) in which to file. Under the version of Article 9 in effect in 1997, a 
situs test applied for "ordinary" goods: the financing statement had to be 
filed where the goods were physically located.87 The secured party would, 
therefore, have been required to file in North Carolina, West Virginia, and 
Maryland. Revised Article 9, at that time poised for approval, is radically 
different. Revised section 9-301(1) states the general rule that with respect 
to nonpossessory security interests, the law of the location of the debtor 
governs issues of perfection. The location of a corporate debtor is the place 
of incorporation.88 So, under revised Article 9, the correct filing jurisdiction 
would be Virginia. 
Given the consequences of misfiling, no reasonable secured party 
would, under any circumstances, have anticipated the adoption of Revised 
Article 9 and responded by filing only in Virginia.89 A secured party foolish 
enough to do such a thing would have been leaving its security interest un-
perfected and allowing it to remain so until the new act took effect.90 Con-
sequently, during this period, the security interest would have been subject 
to defeat by the claims of several different types of claimants. Only a se-
cured party who ignored the likelihood of the change and filed a financing 
statement where required under current law could have received maximum 
protection.91 The general lesson is that parties cannot safely anticipate cer-
tain law changes, irrespective of the desirability of the changes themselves 
or the certainty of retroactive application of the new laws. Even though here 
86. Although revised Article 9 had an effective date of July 1, 2001, see U.C.C. § 9-701 (2005), the 
Article was approved by its sponsors (the A.L.l. and N.C.C.U.S.L.) in 1998. See id.§ 9-101cmt.2. Thus 
from the perspective of transactors in 1997, revised Article 9 was truly a future event. 
87. See id.§ 9-103(1)(b) (1997). 
88. U.C.C. § 9-307(e) states that a "registered organization" organized under state law is located in 
the state of organization. "Registered organization" is defined in section 102(a)(7) to include corpora-
tions. 
89. Of utmost concern to a secured party is that conflicting claims to the collateral could come 
ahead of its security interest. In many cases, a security interest's priority over conflicting claims to the 
collateral will depend on whether the security interest is "perfected." See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-317, 9-322 
(2005). Moreover, a debtor's trustee in bankruptcy can assume the seniority of a hypothetical judicial 
lien creditor and set aside security interests that are unperfected when the debtor enters bankruptcy. See 
11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(l) (2000). The most common method for perfecting a security interest is to file a 
financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a). A financing statement that is filed in the wrong place is 
insufficient to perfect a security interest. 
90. Part 7 of revised Article 9 contains a set of detailed rules that govern the transition from pre-
revision law to full application of the revised Article. See U.C.C. § 9-705(b) (providing that an anticipa-
tory filing under revised Article 9 becomes effective to perfect a security interest when the revised Arti-
cle takes effect). 
91. Nor would the secured party necessarily have to refile once the statute changes. Section 9-705(c) 
continues the effectiveness of financing statements that are filed in the proper state and office under 
former Article 9. The period of continued effectiveness is until June 30, 2006, or the time it would cease 
to be effective under the law of the former jurisdiction, whichever is earlier. 
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the legal change might have been certain to apply retroactively once en-
acted, there remained the need for the protection afforded by the old law 
until enactment of the new one. The secured party could not have safely left 
itself open to a challenge to the legal effectiveness of its financing statement 
during the interim between its receipt of the security interest and the enact-
ment of the new rule. For these types of cases, the effect of an inflexible 
retroactivity norm will be to encourage both anticipation of the law change 
(filing a financing statement in the proper jurisdiction under the new law) 
and reliance on the old law (filing a financing statement in the proper juris-
diction under the old law). Put this way, it is difficult to see how such an 
inefficient "cover-all-bases" strategy engendered by the incentive- or antici-
pation-based perspective would produce social gain. By now, it seems clear 
that the tort, tax, and takings examples supporting a transition policy of pro-
retroactivity application leave troublesome issues unresolved when the con-
textual framework shifts to commercial law. Although the foregoing analy-
sis does not support the efficiency of retroactive implementation of legal 
change in commercial law cases, neither does it prove the inefficiency of 
such a norm in every case. There may very well be valid normative justifi-
cations for treating some commercial law changes in a manner consistent 
with a transition rule of retroactivity. What the above discussion does illus-
trate, however, is the need to tailor transition policy to the nature of the par-
ticular category of legal change at issue. 
II. A PosmvIST VIEW OF LEGISLATIVE RETRO ACTIVITY 
Having examined the pro-retroactivity norm, the assumptions that sup-
port this view of legal transitions, and the ways in which these assumptions 
fail to reflect adequately the structure of the commercial law environment, 
we turn now to an examination of judicial pronouncements on retroactivity 
and statutory responses to the issue by the drafters of the Code. 
A. Legislative Retroactivity and the Courts 
Courts often assert that the prospective or retroactive reach of a statute 
is no more than a question of legislative intent.92 Indeed, there can be little 
doubt that all but the constitutional musings would disappear from the case 
reports if legislative intent were clearly expressed. Consider, for example, 
the Maine Legislative Drafting Manual, which addresses the issue of retro-
activity and provides that "[a] bill that has a retroactive application should 
be drafted with caution. Courts generally will not give a law retroactive 
application unless the intent of the Legislature to make it retroactive is clear 
92. See, e.g., Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 313 (1938); Kolster v. l.N.S., 101 F.3d 785, 788 (!st 
Cir. 1996); Aka v. Jefferson Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 42 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Ark. 2001); Andersen Consulting, 
L.L.P. v. Gavin, 767 A.2d 692, 703-04 (Conn. 2001); Metro. Dade County v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 
737 So. 2d 494, 499 (Ra. 1999). 
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and unambiguous."93 The manual then goes on to give the following illus-
tration of what is meant by a clear and unambiguous statement of intent: 
"This Act applies retroactively to January 1, 1980."94 If legislatures heeded 
such advice, the courts would seldom be called upon to decide questions of 
retroactivity. As a general matter, though, legislatures often neglect to ar-
ticulate their intentions this precisely or even in a manner that reflects that 
the issue of potential retroactivity of the statute was considered. As a result, 
conclusions regarding legislative intent may be intrinsically unstable.95 
In response to this legislative indeterminacy, judicial opinions espouse 
standards and presumptions that purport to guide the quest for legislative 
intent.96 The general position of most courts is that in the absence of clear 
intent to the contrary, it is presumed that the statute was designed to be ap-
plied prospectively.97 Because this presumption is untethered to any particu-
lar constitutional norm, it is not intuitively obvious why it should be the 
preferred canon of statutory construction.98 Indeed, it is striking that courts 
often revert to the crude notion that prospective application of new statutes 
is necessary as a matter of fairness with little or no elaboration.99 If an ex-
planation is offered for why retroactive application would be unfair, it is 
usually that people should be able to rely on existing law and to conform 
their conduct accordingly. 100 An obvious shortcoming of this conclusory 
approach is that there is no balancing of opposing policies and legislative 
objectives that might militate in favor of a contrary opinion. 
93. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, ME. ST A TE LEGISLATURE, MAINE l.EGISLA TIVE DRAFfING MANUAL, pt. 
II, at 14 (rev. ed. 1994). 
94. Id. 
95. As one would expect when the judicial quest is for legislative intent, courts sometimes rely on 
indicators that may be less than convincing, if only because of the difficulty in obtaining more reliable 
measures of intent. Compare Goodwin Bros. Leasing, Inc. v. Nousis, 366 N.E.2d 38, 41 (Mass. 1977) 
(the words "no action shall be maintained" indicates that a retroactive application was intended), with 
Dillon v. Coughlin, 539 N.Y.S.2d 880, 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (noting that the use of the word "shall" 
indicates that prospective application was intended), affd, 550 N.Y.S.2d 115 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989). 
96. In several states, courts are guided by statutes that dictate the prospective application of legal 
change unless the new law clearly, by express language or necessary implication, indicates that the 
legislature intended a retroactive application. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 446.080(3) (LexisNexis 
1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:2 (2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.21 (West 1947); see also UNIF. 
STATUTE & RULECONSTR. ACT§ 8 (1995), 14 U.L.A. 488 (2005). 
97. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314 (1908) 
(recognizing that "[t]he presumption is very strong that a statute was not meant to act retrospectively, 
and it ought never to receive such a construction if it is susceptible of any other"). 
98. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactiv-
ity, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 432-33 (observing that "on numerous occasions, the presumption 
of prospectivity continues to be summoned up in the original English sense-purely as a maxim of 
favored statutory construction and divorced from the presumption in favor of constitutionality"). 
99. See, e.g., U.S. Olympic Comm. v. Toy Truck Lines, Inc., 237 F.3d 1331, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 
S.C. Dep't of Revenue v. Rosemary Coin Machs. Inc., 528 S.E.2d 416, 418 (S.C. 2000); see also Eule, 
supra note 98, at 433 (discussing Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S. 632 (1985), and concluding that the 
presumption of prospectivity "seems to enjoy a life of its own, although the Court fails to provide us 
with a rationale for such rule where constitutional constraints are not at play"). 
100. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ctr., 551F.2d476, 483-84 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Normally the 
presumption against retroactivity is designed to protect reasonable reliance on prior settled law while 
permitting the new law full prospective effect."). 
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Arguments for prospectivity grounded in fairness are less convincing 
when the statutory change is "procedural" rather than "substantive." As 
commonly understood, a statute effects a substantive change if it creates or 
alters rights, duties, and obligations and a procedural change if it addresses 
the methods of enforcement of rights, duties, and obligations. 101 It has fre-
quently been said that because procedural rules do not abrogate substantive 
rights, they may be applied retroactively without fear of disturbing expecta-
tion interests, even without clear legislative intent. 102 Reliance on such ster-
ile classifications seems suspect, however, since both procedural and sub-
stantive statutes may in fact affect past transactions and a decision based 
solely on the statute's classification may merely dictate a conclusion with-
out adequate justification. 103 It is instructive, for example, to consider the 
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Maine in Sinclair v. Sinclair. 104 In that 
case, mortgagors instituted foreclosure proceedings but failed to comply 
with a statute that required that the mortgagee be given notice of her right to 
cure the default. The mortgagees argued that because the statute mandating 
notice was enacted after the mortgage was executed, it was never intended 
to apply retroactively to them. In rejecting the mortgagees' contention, the 
court explained why an analysis based on the classification of statutes as 
substantive or procedural should be discredited: 
The issue before us today is a prime example of the limitations of 
an analysis that relies on the elusive distinction between substance 
and procedure. We could declare that section 6111 affects the sub-
stantive rights of the mortgagee of a preexisting mortgage and pre-
sumptively will not apply to a preexisting mortgage. On the other 
hand, we could declare that section 6111 affects only the procedural 
mechanism of a foreclosure action commenced after its effective 
date and presumptively will apply to that action. Applying a label 
101. See, e.g., Weyant v. Macintyre, 438 S.E.2d 640, 642 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993); In re Kaul, 4 P.3d 
1170, 1171 (Kan. 2000). 
102. See, e.g., Landgraf v. USI Film Prod., 511 U.S. 244, 275 (1994) (concluding that "[c]hanges in 
procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before their enactment without raising concerns 
about retroactivity"). But even a procedural statute will not be applied retroactively if it has so-called 
"retroactive impact." It would have retroactive impact "if it (1) impairs rights that a party possessed 
when it acted, (2) increases a party's liability for past conduct, or (3) imposes new duties with respect to 
transactions already completed." Schweikert v. AG Serv. of Am., Inc., 823 N.E.2d 213, 217 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2005). It has been broadly stated that "curative" statutes are another brand of statute to be given 
retroactive effect. See, e.g., Fasching v. Kallinger, 546 A.2d 1094, 1096 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1988). A statute of this type "amends a previous law which is unclear or which does not effectuate the 
actual intent of the Legislature in adopting the original act." Id. 
103. See Robert C. Feldmeier, The Illinois Supreme Court's Latest Last Word on Statutory Retroac-
tivity, 92 ILL. B.J. 260, 265 (2004) (labeling the distinction between substance and procedure as "elu-
sive"); Gene A. Maguire, Retroactive Application of Statutes: Protection of Reliance Interests, 40 ME. L. 
REV. 183, 204 (1988) (concluding that "the distinction between substantive and procedural statutes 
admits of no bright line"). 
104. 654 A.2d 438 (Me. 1995). 
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foretells the result but does not materially contribute to a principled 
decision. 105 
The court then reviewed the legislative purpose for enacting the notice pro-
vision and concluded that the legislature intended for the statute to have a 
retroactive effect on preexisting mortgagor/mortgagee contractual relation-
ships.106 
Another common formulation, related to the proposition that substan-
tive changes to the law should not be applied retroactively, asserts that a 
statute will not be given retroactive effect if interferes with vested rights. 107 
This standard, too, is subject to manipulation for the simple reason that it is 
not always clear what rights may be considered "vested."108 The sample of 
reported cases collected by Bryant Smith in which courts have rejected the 
contention that a statute, if applied retroactively, would destroy vested 
rights, leaves one with the firm impression that there may very well be other 
explanatory variables at work. 
[W]hat shall be said of a law that extinguishes an existing attach-
ment lien, or changes existing estates tail into fees simple, or joint 
tenancies into tenancies in common, or confirms an invalid tax as-
sessment, or imposes an inheritance tax after the death of the de-
ceased, or denies a statutory penalty after the right to the penalty 
has already accrued? More difficult than these, what of a law that 
makes past acts a ground for divorce, so that a spouse who before 
the law could have successfully defended a divorce action is now li-
able to an adverse judgment in such a proceeding, or a law that, 
without his consent, makes a husband of one who theretofore was 
unmarried? What of a law that validates a defective deed and 
105. Id. at 439-40. 
106. Id. at 440. Other examples abound of the eely nature of the substance/procedure distinction. For 
example, is a change to the relevant statute of limitations period a substantive or a procedural matter? On 
the one hand, the change could be viewed as procedural because the statute does "not have the effect of 
changing the legal significance of prior events or acts." Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 
814, 816 (Me. 1980). On the other hand, retroactive application of a shorter limitations period may 
completely bar the assertion of an existing claim and therefore be viewed as substantive. See, e.g., Cecil-
ian Bank v. Sarver, No. 2002-CA-000076-MR, 2003 WL 23005721, at *l (Ky. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2003) 
(holding that the addition of a limitations section to Article 3 of the U.C.C. was substantive). 
107. See, e.g., Ex pane F.P., 857 So.2d 125 (Ala. 2003); City of Hartford v. Freedom of Info. 
Comm'n., 518 A.2d 49 (Conn. 1986); Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., v. City of Atlanta, 560 S.E.2d 525 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2002); Raymond v. Jenard, 390 A.2d 358 (R.I. 1978). 
108. See Berkley Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Berkley Condo. Residences, Inc., 448 A.2d 510, 515 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1982) (observing that ''the term ... 'vested rights[]' tends to be conclusory"); In re 
Santore, 623 P.2d 702, 706 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (stating that ''vested right" is merely a "conclusory 
label"). Indeed, John Austin made this very same point more than one hundred years ago: 
When it is said that the Legislature ought not to deprive parties of their "vested rights," all 
that is meant is that the rights styled ''vested" are sacred or inviolable, or are such as the par-
ties ought not to be deprived of by the Legislature. The phrase is either purely an identical 
proposition or begs the question at issue. 
2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW 256 (Robert 
Campbell ed., Jersey City: Frederick D. Linn & Co. 1875). 
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thereby transfers the ownership of land from A to B, or harder still, 
what of a law that, by legitimizing an illegitimate child, takes prop-
erty from an heir who before the law had a perfect title in every re-
spect and for all purposes, and gives it to a remote purchaser from 
the illegitimate? If the term "vested" means anything at all, some of 
these laws certainly take away vested rights and yet such laws have 
been sustained. 109 
Reported retroactivity disputes thus fall into two general categories of 
cases: Those in which a legislative intent argument is central to the court's 
decision and those in which a surrogate for intent-such as the sub-
stance/procedure dichotomy-is relied upon. Since the need to apply either 
methodology exists only because the legislature has imperfectly expressed 
its intent, if at all, and both rely on mutable criteria, it is clear that caution 
must be exercised in interpreting outcomes. While a full discussion of the 
cases is beyond the scope of this Article, they suggest that a court's own 
policy preference is an important and significant explanation for a decision 
whether to give a statute retroactive effect or not. 110 It was into this judicial 
morass that Karl Llewellyn and his U.C.C. reporters and drafters stepped. 
B. Legislative Retroactivity and the Code 
From its inception, the Code embraced the norm that retroactive appli-
cation of its new provisions would generally be undesirable. Section 10-101 
provides that the Code "applies to transactions entered into and events oc-
curring after [its effective date]."111 This section must be read in conjunction 
with the saving provision contained in section 10-102. It reads: 
Transactions validly entered into before the effective date ... and 
the rights, duties and interests flowing from them remain valid 
thereafter and may be terminated, completed, consummated or en-
forced as required or permitted by any statute or other law amended 
or repealed by this Act [the Code] as though such repeal or amend-
ment had not occurred.112 
109. Smith, supra note 3, at 245-46. 
110. See Maguire, supra note 103, at 189 ('The problem with applying the court's general, all-
purpose method of statutory construction to retroactivity problems is that it creates too great an opportu-
nity for the court to read its own policy preferences into the statute where the Legislature has expressed 
its intent at all ambiguously."). 
111. U.C.C. § 10-101 (1962). 
112. U.C.C. § 10-102. A number of jurisdictions found it advisable to expand and modify section 10-
102 to address certain issues regarding the continued effectiveness of pre-Code secured transactions. See, 
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-10-l02 (West 2002 & Supp. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1301.15 {LexisNexis 2002); 1961 N.H. LAWS 122; 1964 N.Y. LAWS 1390. Thus, it was recognized early 
on that different transition rules might be necessary for different commercial law issues. For further 
discussion of the possibility that a single transition rule might not always be the best way to deal with the 
many rule changes that result from a revision or amendment of a U.C.C. article, see infra notes 183-184 
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It is interesting to note that the term "transactions," as used in both sections, 
and the term "events," as used in section 10-101, are nowhere defined in the 
Code. In its 1956 report relating to the Code, The New York Law Revision 
Commission expressed concern that post-Code transactions had the poten-
tial to disturb contractual or property rights antedating the transaction. 113 
For example, when the issuance of a negotiable instrument predates the 
Code, what law would govern if it were "negotiated, presented, extended, 
discharged, dishonored or collected [after the Code's effective date]?"114 
Consider also a pre-Code contract modified after the Code's new modifica-
tion rules have gone into effect. Does the modification receive the saving 
grace of section 2-209(1) that abrogates the pre-existing duty rule by mak-
ing good faith contract modifications enforceable without consideration?115 
Given the number, variety, and outcomes of reported cases involving the 
Article 10 transition provisions, one can discern a clear bias against apply-
ing the Code to transactions that were initiated prior to its adoption. 116 
For instance, in Empire Life Insurance Co. of America v. Valdak 
Corp., 117 a secured transaction involving pledged stock was entered into 
before the effective date of the Code. The foreclosure sale, however, oc-
curred after the effective date of the Code. Under pre-Code law, the stan-
dard for judging the validity of the foreclosure sale was significantly differ-
ent from the Code's standard of "commercial reasonableness."118 Prior law 
required only a disposition of the collateral in "good faith." 119 The district 
court tried the case under the assumption that the Code governed the fore-
closure, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed. The appellate court found inescap-
able the conclusion that, because the security agreement was executed be-
fore the effective date of the Code, it was "governed by the prior law, even 
as to those aspects of the transaction, including the foreclosure, that took 
place after the effective date of the Code."120 In other words, the court held 
that the post-Code foreclosure was not an "event" that made applicable the 
Code's new standard of commercial reasonableness. 121 
and accompanying text. 
113. See STATE OF N.Y., LAW REVISION COMM'N, REPORT RELATING TO THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE 32 (1956). 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Recall that courts have never hesitated to give a statute retroactive effect if it deals with practice 
or procedure. See supra notes 101-106 and accompanying text. This distinction between substantive and 
procedural continues to persist under the Code. See, e.g., United Sec. Corp. v. Bruton, 213 A.2d 892, 893 
(D.C. 1965) (holding that section 3-307(3), placing the burden of proof on the person claiming holder in 
due course status, applies to all proceedings after its effective date). But there is the usual problem of 
determining whether a change is, in fact, procedural. Compare Ohio Brass Co. v. Allied Prods. Corp., 
339 F. Supp. 417, 424 (N.D. Ohio 1972) (the statute oflimitations provided for in section 2-725 is pro-
cedural and applies retroactively), with Hall v. Gurley Milling Co., 347 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D.N.C. 1972) 
(section 2-725 is substantive and will not be applied retroactively). 
117. 468 F.2d 330 {5th Cir. 1972). 
118. See U.C.C. § 9-504 (2005). 
119. Valdak, 468 F.2d at 334. 
120. Id. at 333. 
121. Interestingly, this is not the statutory position taken by revised Article 9 in which the general 
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The same sort of restrictive scope given to the Article 10 words "trans-
actions" and "events" in Empire Life is also found in cases in which the 
post-Code occurrence is independent of either party's activities. In Florida 
Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 122 for example, the par-
ties entered into two pre-Code contracts whereby Westinghouse agreed to 
furnish Florida Power and Light (FPL) with the equigment and fuel neces-
sary to construct and operate a nuclear power plant. 23 FPL had no choice 
but to purchase fuel from Westinghouse but was allowed to choose among 
three alternative arrangements. 124 After the Code was adopted in Florida, 
Westinghouse notified FPL that Westinghouse was excused from having to 
perform these two contracts by reason of the failure of presupposed condi-
tions (commercial impracticability), as provided in U.C.C. section 2-615. 125 
Specifically, it was Westinghouse's contention that its performance had 
been made impracticable by the failure of the uranium market to remain 
stable in price or quantities available. 126 The district court held that the 
U.C.C. did not apply retroactively to contracts entered into prior to the 
Code's effective date, and hence, the case was governed by the common 
law of excuse in Florida.127 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed. 128 The 
court held that neither Westinghouse's contractual default, nor the election 
by FPL of its fuel service option, nor the alleged failure of presupposed 
conditions could be considered an "event" under section 10-101. 129 
The above cases strongly suggest that the time-honored presumption 
against retroactive application of legislation was the predominant defining 
approach taken by courts at the birth of the Code. 130 A stark contrast 
transitional rule is one of retroactivity. Section 9-702(a) provides, broadly, that the Revised Text "ap-
plies to a transaction ... within its scope, even if the transaction ... was entered into ... before [the 
Effective Date]." U.C.C. § 9-702(a). 
122. 579 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1978). 
123. Id. at 857. 
124. In addition to the two contracts mentioned in the text, FPL was also given an option to purchase 
equipment and fuel for a second plant. The option to purchase was exercised after the Code took effect. 
This, according to the Fourth Circuit. was an "event" so as to make the Code the applicable source of 
law. According to the court, once the option was exercised, a new post-Code contract resulted. See id. at 
859-60. Similarly, in A. J. Armstrong Co. v. Janburt Embroidery Corp., 234 A.2d 737 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div. 1967), the parties, after the Code's adoption, refinanced a promissory note and chattel mort-
gage that were executed prior to the effective date of the Code. The parties were presumed to have 
contracted in the light of the law (i.e., the Code) as it existed at the time of the refinancing. Id. at 742. 
125. Florida Power & Light, 519 F.2d at 858. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 859. 
129. Id. at 863. 
130. This conclusion is supported by a host of other cases. See, e.g., Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 
396 S.W.2d 300, 301-02 (Ark. 1965) (post-Code grant of security interest in fixtures did not make Code 
applicable in dispute between fixture financer and pre-Code real estate mortgagee); Peachtree News Co. 
v. MacMillan Co., 145 S.E.2d 666, 667 (Ga. Ct. App. 1965) (post-Code tender of goods was not an 
"event" that changed the tender rules in effect at the time the time the Code took effect); In re 49 Madi-
son Grocery Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 90, 92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (post-Code assignment for the 
benefit of creditors was not an "event" that made the Code applicable to pre-Code transactions by the 
assignor). Despite this general anti-retroactivity bias, there are decisions that do apply the Code retroac-
tively. See, e.g., B & H Warehouse, Inc. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 517, 523 (N.D. Tex. 
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emerges, however, when one examines the transition rules that were put into 
place to respond to the far-reaching changes made by the 1972 revisions of 
Article 9. 
Article 9, it may be recalled, was the first article to be significantly re-
vised after the drafters put the finishing touches on the 1962 Official Text, 
which became the first generally adopted version of the Code. The work of 
the Article 9 Review Committee began in 1967 and culminated in the 1972 
Official Text. Along with substantive changes to the Code, the drafters 
added a new Article 11 to govern the transition to the new version. Al-
though section 11-102 preserves the principle of section 10-102-i.e., that 
pre-Code law should apply to pre-Code transactions, 131-section 11-103 
adopted a radically different approach for determining which law should 
apply to secured transactions that were entered into under the prior version 
of the Code. The principle is one of almost complete retroactivity. The ex-
planation for this remarkable policy shift is provided in the discussion of 
section 11-102: "A different principle is set forth in this Article 11 for tran-
sition problems between the [old Code] and the [new Code], because the 
changes are not nearly as great. That principle is that the [new Code] gov-
erns (with minor exceptions)."132 
One is left to ponder exactly what motivated the drafters of the 1972 
Official Text to take a position contrary to the usual treatment of legislative 
retroactivity. Could it really be that a retroactive approach was chosen be-
cause the changes wrought by the new text were not great? If this assertion 
is to be believed, then it would follow that the scale would be tipped in fa-
vor of retroactivity whenever statutory changes are either few in number or 
fall below some indeterminate standard of significance. In this decisional 
setting, the reliance and expectations of affected transactors would be 
largely ignored-a curious approach, indeed, for sophisticated drafters. An 
alternative explanation has been offered by William Hawkland: "Convinced 
of the merits of these amendments, the drafters of Article 11 were eager to 
have them apply wherever possible."133 It seems implausible, though, that 
the drafters could have produced the Code initially and at other times made 
changes to it without a strong belief in the merits and desirability of the 
underlying substantive law. Perhaps the drafters were merely following the 
1972) (holding because stock, purchased pre-Code, was transferred post-Code, the Code applied to 
transfer restrictions), rev'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1974); Gen. Elec. Credit Corp. v. R. 
A. Heintz Constr. Co., 302 F. Supp. 958, 968 (0. Or. 1969) (finding the Code governed the rights of a 
buyer who purchased goods after the effective date of the Code as against a party who had a pre-Code 
security interest in those same goods). 
131. The purpose of section 11-102 is to make clear that the Article 10 transition rules are being 
maintained in order to provide the appropriate rules in those states in which the Code has been on the 
books for a relatively short period of time and pre-Code transactions are still being litigated. See U .C.C. 
§ 11-102 introduction (1972). 
132. Id. One minor exception to this new principle of retroactivity is that the "[old U.C.C.] shall 
apply to any questions of priority if the positions of the parties were fixed prior to the effective date of 
[new UCC]." U.C.C. § 11-107. 
133. 10 HAWKLAND, U.C.C. SERIES§ 11-103.01[Art.11), at 7 (2002). 
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Supreme Court's lead in exhibiting a greater willingness to tolerate retroac-
tive legislation where the object of the legislation in question is to alter an 
existent statutory scheme rather than to fill a statutory void. 134 Their motiva-
tions and rationales may never be fully understood. 
Whatever the reason(s) for the retroactive treatment of changes to Arti-
cle 9, 135 however, with one exception, the drafters have traveled a different 
path with regard to subsequent evolutionary changes to the Code. Within 
the past two decades, numerous U.C.C. drafting committees have had the 
opportunity to consider the appropriate transition policy that should govern 
revisions and amendments to articles other than Article 9. 136 Given the ef-
forts at drafting Articles 10 and 11, one might have expected to see rather 
extensive analysis of the rationale for and permissible limits of retroactivity. 
Yet the body of recently amended and revised articles frustrates that expec-
tation. As to current Articles 1, 3, 4, 4A, and 6, the statutory silence has 
been deafening: they simply do not address the transition problems between 
the old Code and new Code. It is difficult to determine whether this hands-
off approach was taken by design or merely resulted from inattention. In 
view of the long history of judicial bias against retroactivity, though, the 
failure of the statute to speak will surely be viewed as an endorsement of the 
case law status quo. In other words, a statutory change that does not specify 
retroactive treatment is almost certain to signal approval of a transition pol-
icy favoring prospective application only. Indeed, this is precisely the man-
ner in which most courts have applied the changes. 137 
By contrast, an explicit policymaking effort against retroactivity can be 
seen in current Articles 2, 2A, 5, and 7 .138 Section 2-803 exemplifies this 
effort. It reads as follows: 
134. See, e.g., Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 310 U.S. 32, 38 (1940) (holding a statutory 
amendment restricting stock withdrawal rights constitutional because "[w]hen [Veix] purchased into an 
enterprise already regulated in the particular to which he now objects, he purchased subject to further 
legislation upon the same topic"); see also Eule, supra note 98, at 452 ("Retroactive statutes constructed 
on vacant lots have ironically fared worse with the courts than retrospective efforts to alter prior statu-
tory schemes."). 
135. Recall that the drafters of the 1998 version of Article 9 were also of the opinion that there was 
no need to further defer its application. See supra note 121. This is not to suggest that every provision in 
revised Article 9 was intended to apply retroactively without transition relief. There are grandfathering 
and grace periods aplenty. See generally HARRY C. SIGMAN & EDWIN E. SMITH, THE TRANSITION 
RULES OF REVISED ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (2001). This booklet is available 
free of charge from CT Corporation. 
136. See supra note 15. 
137. See, e.g., In re Chi. Coastal Motor Express, Inc., No. 92-60070, 1992 WL 309184, at *8 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ind. June 3, 1992) (holding the 1987 Official UCC Text of section 1-201(37)(b) may not be applied 
retroactively); Choo Choo Tire Serv., Inc. v. Union Planters Nat'I Bank, 498 S.E.2d 799, 801 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1998) (holding the 1990 Official UCC Text of sections 3-103 and 3-302 may not be applied retro-
actively); Cecilian Bank v. Sarver, No. 2002-CA-000076-MR, 2003 WL 23005721, at *I (Ky. Ct. App. 
Dec. 24, 2003) (holding the 1990 Official UCC text of section 3-118 may not be applied retroactively); 
Carelli v. Hall, 926 P.2d 756, 762 (Mont. 1996) (holding the 1990 Official UCC Text of section 3-403 
may not be applied retroactively). But see Carnegie Bank v. Shalleck, 606 A.2d 389, 397 (NJ. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 1992) (holding the 1990 Official Text of section 3-112 must be applied retroactively). 
138. See U.C.C. §§ 2-803 (2003), 2A-603 (2003), 5-115 cmt. 3 (1995), 7-703 (2003). 
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(1) This [Act] applies to a transaction within its scope that is en-
tered into on or after the effective date of this [Act]. 
(2) This [Act] does not apply to a transaction that is entered into be-
fore the effective date of this [Act] even if the transaction would be 
subject to this [Act] if it had been entered into after the effective 
date of this [Act]. 139 
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While section 2-803 sets forth a clear rule, no official comment is included 
to explain the drafting committee's underlying theory of legal transitions or 
to offer additional guidance about how to approach this critically important 
and pervasive problem. Indeed, there is no evidence to indicate that this 
provision was even considered by the entire drafting committee.140 
The two simple statutory patterns elaborated above (i.e., silence and ex-
plicit non-retroactivity) would have failed to predict the significantly differ-
ent policy option chosen by those responsible for the 1994 Official Text of 
Article 8. The general transition rule for Revised Article 8 is that the new 
law is to be given full retroactive effect with respect to all transactions that 
fall within its substantive coverage, without regard to the date upon which 
those transactions took place.141 The justification for this approach is re-
vealed in the Official Comment following section 8-603: 
The revision of Article 8 should present few significant transi-
tion problems. Although the revision involves significant changes in 
terminology and analysis, the substantive rules are, in large meas-
ure, based upon the current practices and are consistent with results 
that could be reached, albeit at times with some struggle, by proper 
interpretation of the rules of present law. Thus, the new rules can be 
applied, without significant dislocations, to transactions and events 
that occurred prior to enactment. 
The enacting provisions should not, whether by applicability, 
transition, or savings clause language, attempt to provide that old 
Article 8 continues to apply to "transactions," "events," "rights," 
"duties," "liabilities," or the like that occurred or accrued before the 
effective date and that new Article 8 applies to those that occur or 
accrue after the effective date. The reason for revising Article 8 and 
139. u.c.c. § 2-803. 
140. The author of this Article was the American Bar Association advisor to the Article 2 Drafting 
Committee from the inception of the project in 1991through1999. To the author's knowledge, not once 
during this period was the issue of transition policy raised by anyone associated with the project. 
141. This transition rule follows from the statement in section 8-601 that 'This [Act] takes effect [on 
whatever date is selected by the enacting jurisdiction]." Old Article 8 will continue to apply in only two 
situations. It will be the law to be applied to in lawsuits actually commenced prior to the effective date of 
revised Article 8 and, in some cases, to security interests in investment property that were perfected 
under the pre-1994 version of the statute. See U.C.C. § 8-603(a)-(b) (1994). 
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corresponding provisions of Article 9 is the concern that the provi-
. sions of old Article 8 could be interpreted or misinterpreted to yield 
results that impede the safe and efficient operation of the national 
system for the clearance and settlement of securities transactions. 
Accordingly, it is not the case that any effort should be made to pre-
serve the applicability of old Article 8 to transactions and events 
that occurred before the effective date. 142 
The rationale expressed in the foregoing Comment generates significant and 
robust implications and provides foundational substance for a general theory 
of when commercial law changes should be applied retroactively. The next 
Part of this Article begins the task of building and applying such a theory. 
Ill. A THEORY OF TRANSITION POLICY FOR COMMERCIAL LAW CHANGES 
As noted in the Introduction, retroactive legislation has long been 
viewed with disfavor by courts and commentators alike. 143 Traditional nor-
mative criticism of retroactivity has rested on two related assertions: Fair-
ness mandates giving people the opportunity to know in advance what laws 
will govern their affairs and prohibits changing the rules in midstream, 144 
and retroactive laws defeat the legitimate expectations of the persons af-
fected.145 Writing in 1875, John Austin commented that "[w]herever expec-
tations have been raised in accordance with the declared purpose and con-
cession of the State, to disappoint those expectations by recall of the con-
cession without a manifest preponderance of general utility is ... perni-
cious."146 In order to construct a rational model of transition policy for 
commercial law, it is first helpful to explore the assertions underlying this 
normative critique of retroactivity in a commercial setting. 
A. Sheltering Expectations: The Common View 
At their core, commercial transactions involve "deals." The principle 
end of such deals is to secure a value-maximizing exchange of property. 
Consider, for example, a simple contract for the purchase and sale of a lawn 
mower for $200. Presumably, for this voluntary exchange to occur, it must 
142. U.C.C. § 8-603 cmt. 
143. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. 
144. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 3, § 41.02, at 341 ("It is a fundamental principle of jurisprudence 
that retroactive application of new laws is usually unfair. There is general consensus that notice or warn-
ing of the rule should be given in advance of the actions whose effects are to be judged." (footnotes 
omitted)). 
145. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 98, at 437 ('The objection to retroactivity that is most often observed 
searching for a constitutional home is one that is concerned with fulfilling citizens' expectations."); 
Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Retroactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 425 (1982) ("A common 
view holds that retroactivity is not often justifiable. This view rests on the ideas that it is undesirable to 
upset expectations and that it is contrary to the rule of law to change legal rules in the middle of the 
game."). 
146. AUSTIN, supra note 108, at 256. 
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benefit both parties-the seller must value $200 more than the lawn mower 
and the buyer must value the lawn mower more than $200. Further, all such 
deals involve a number of risks. For example, there is the risk that either the 
buyer or the seller might be dishonest or otherwise fail to perform. If the 
buyer wrongfully refuses to pay for the lawn mower or the seller wrongfully 
refuses to deliver it, the aggrieved party may have to face the vagaries, un-
certainties, and delays of the judicial system in order to obtain relief. There 
is also the risk that the lawn mower will be damaged or lost before delivery 
is made to the buyer. Finally, there is the risk that the lawn mower will not 
perform as expected. Given these and other risks, the practical task facing 
the contracting parties is to shape the transaction so that the burdens and 
risks are allocated in a manner acceptable to each. 147 In order to do so effec-
tively, it is absolutely essential that the parties have a basic understanding of 
the law applicable to the contract. If the parties cannot feel secure at the 
outset that a court will act in a specific, predictable fashion if presented with 
a particular question, a coherent contract will not be possible. Legal unpre-
dictability will hinder, rather than facilitate, commerce. Neither the buyer 
nor the seller of the lawn mower will be able to accurately price his or her 
performance. As a result, deals will tend to be less efficient, and some mu-
tually beneficial deals would likely not take place at all. 148 Moreover, law-
yers will be unable to advise clients while deals are still in the process of 
being shaped. 
One of the most interesting and important manifestations of the gener-
ally accepted view that a central purpose of commercial law is to protect 
reasonable expectations is the current debate concerning Llewellyn's con-
textual orientation to sales law .149 The participants in this debate recognize 
that there are two competing ways of interpreting a contract: the formalist 
way and the antiformalist way. The formalist way or approach (or, because 
its advocates would have us return to the formalist days of yore, perhaps the 
more accurate description is the neoformalist approach)150 views the con-
tract as being limited only to the words on the page, infused with whatever 
147. If the parties have failed to address a particular contingency in their contract, it may be norma-
tively correct to provide them with a default rule that they most probably would have chosen for them-
selves at the time of contracting had they thought about the matter. 
148. Others have made similar observations. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 98, at 440 ("Advance plan-
ning is necessary for economic development. Investments that will be legally as well as financially 
speculative are less likely to be undertaken. Those who rely on existing law are undoubtedly entitled to 
certain assurances that their interests will not be undervalued or ignored by future lawmakers."). Without 
predictability, individuals would be unable to plan their affairs-business or otherwise-with any degree 
of certainty. See infra note 12. 
149. See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 781 (1999); Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2's Incorporation 
Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 710 (1999); James W. Bowers, Incomplete Law, 62 
LA. L. REV. 1229 (2002); Robert E. Scott, The Uniformity Norm in Commercial Law: A Comparative 
Analysis of Common Law and Code Methodologies, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 149 (Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000). 
150. See William J. Woodward, Jr., Neoformalism in a Real World of Forms, 2001 WIS. L. REV. 971, 
l 004 (noting that there has been a "flurry of neoformalism in contracts scholarship"). 
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meaning can be derived from an ordinary dictionary. 151 The antiformalist 
approach (Llewellyn's idea of the correct way) sees a contract as a contex-
tual text with room to accommodate all surrounding circumstances, includ-
ing past dealings, trade customs, and the pattern of contract performance. 152 
The formalist approach promises to respect the parties' expectations by 
keeping judges in check. All it asks is "that the court respect the literal and 
explicit terms of the contract"153 rather than embark on a search for business 
norms that may or may not exist, 154 may or may not be discoverable, 155 may 
or may not be efficient, 156 and may or may not have been within the con-
templation of the parties. 157 The antiformalist position, on the other hand, is 
premised on the belief that "parties develop expectations over time against 
the background of commercial practices and that if commercial law fails to 
account for those practices, it will cut against the parties' actual expecta-
tions."158 
The debate might be amenable to resolution if more empirical informa-
tion were available to help answer a host of issues raised by the neoformal-
ist analysis. For example, it is an empirical question whether attributing a 
dictionary meaning to the contract is more likely to accord with what the 
parties actually intended than an inquiry that entails a reference to external 
facts and circumstances.159 Indeed, even Professor Scott acknowledges that 
"[i]t is clear that more analysis, both theoretical and empirical, is required 
151. See id. at 975-76. 
152. The Code definition of "Agreement" reads: "'Agreement', as distinguished from 'contract', 
means the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, 
including course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in Section 1-303." 
u.c.c. § l-20l(b)(3) (2001). 
153. Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 851 
n.12 (2000). 
154. See Llsa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Search for 
Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1808-11 (1996). 
155. See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 
NW. U. L. REV. 749, 753-54 (2000). 
156. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1724 
(1996). 
157. See id. at 1711-13. 
158. PEB Commentary No. 10, Section 1-203 (Feb. 10, 1994), reprinted in SELECTED COMMERCIAL 
STATUTES 1382 (Thompson/West 2006). Comment 1 to U.C.C. section 1-303 ("Course of Performance, 
Course of Dealing, and Usage of Trade") clearly expresses Llewellyn's realism. It provides: 
The Uniform Commercial Code rejects both the "lay-dictionary" and the "conveyancer's" 
reading of a commercial agreement. Instead the meaning of the agreement of the parties is to 
be determined by the language used by them and by their action, read and interpreted in the 
light of commercial practices and other surrounding circumstances. The measure and back-
ground for interpretation are set by the commercial context, which may explain and supple-
ment even the language of a formal or final writing. 
U.C.C. § 1-303 cmt. 1 (2001). 
159. See Bowers, supra note 149, at 1238 ("It is an empirical question whether traders' use of lan-
guage always conforms so tightly with the dictionary meaning so that a rigidly formalistic interpretive 
technique, determining the true content of the parties' promises from the dictionary meaning of the 
words in their promises alone, is the strategy least likely to reach erroneous conclusions about what they 
really promised each other."); see also Robert A. Hillman, Comment: More in Defense of U.C.C. Meth-
odology, 62 LA. L. REV. 1153, 1157-60 (2002) (suggesting other issues of an empirical nature). 
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before anyone can safely call for radical reform." 160 Although a full discus-
sion of the neoformalist-antiformalist debate is beyond the scope of this 
Article, it does serve as an instructive reminder that one of the key objec-
tives of a commercial law system is to establish a method of resolving con-
troversies with due regard to the settled expectations of the parties. Having 
acknowledged the significance of the parties' expectations, transition policy 
must account for this normative goal. 
B. Sheltering Expectations: The Less Common View 
Not only does protecting settled expectations produce a result believed 
to be morally just, 161 but it also serves the instrumentalist goal of promoting 
market transactions which, in a capitalistic society, are the primary means of 
allocating resources from less to more valuable uses. To some, however, the 
notion that reliance on existing legal rules plays a significant role in govern-
ing the day-to-day behavior of commercial transactors is particularly prob-
lematic. 
This skepticism is the result of recognizing that a significant degree of 
indeterminacy remains in the law and that unexpected legal outcomes due to 
unanticipated contingencies cannot be altogether eliminated even by the 
most careful statutory drafting. Nor would skillful drafters want to risk the 
perils associated with writing in terms too particular. 162 The drafters of the 
U.C.C., aware that codification sometimes fails because of the excessive 
rigidity of statutory commands and cognizant of the wide variety of contexts 
in which the Code would be applied, aimed to craft it so as to provide a de-
sirable degree of flexibility in implementation. 163 In addition, interpretation 
160. Scott, supra note 149, at 175. 
161. See SINGER, supra note 3, § 41.05, at 370 ("One of the fundamental considerations of fairness 
recognized in every legal system is that settled expectations honestly arrived at with respect to substan-
tial interests ought not be defeated."). 
162. Apart from the inevitable indeterminacy of statutory formulations, see Anthony D' Amato, 
Counterintuitive Consequences of "Plain Meaning," 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 529, 530-34 (1991), inherent in 
any piece of legislation is what Professor Hart has called an "indeterminacy in ... aim." H.L.A. HART, 
THE CONCEPT OF LAW 128 (1961). To make this point, Hart posits an ordinance barring vehicles from a 
public park. Id. at 125. Although it may be clear that, if the purpose of the law is to maintain peace and 
quiet, then the legislature intended to banish cars, buses, and motorcycles; it is unclear whether any other 
"vehicles" were intended to be excluded: 
We have initially settled the question that peace and quiet in the park is to be maintained at 
the cost, at any rate, of the exclusion of these things. On the other hand, until we have put the 
general aim of peace in the park into conjunction with those cases which we did not, or per-
haps could not, initially envisage (perhaps a toy motor-car electrically propelled) our aim is, 
in this direction indeterminate. We have not settled, because we have not anticipated, the 
question which will be raised by the unenvisaged case when it occurs: whether some degree 
of peace in the park is to be sacrificed to, or defended against, those children whose pleasure 
or interest it is to use these things. 
Id. at 126. 
163. This point is made by Grant Gilmore with considerable force: 
[I]t is a matter of vital importance that the Code as a whole be kept in terms of such general-
ity as to allow an easy and unstrained application of its provisions to new patterns of business 
behavior. Commercial codification cannot successfully overparticularize: the penalty for be-
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of the Code is sometimes complicated by new technological developments 
and evolving business practices, 164 creating genuine problems for those who 
must apply it. 165 Finally, the interpretative task can be confounded by the 
use of undefined terms. 
Consider the "basis of the bargain" requirement for an express warranty 
under U.C.C. section 2-313. Under the precursor to Article 2, the Uniform 
Sales Act, actual reliance by the buyer on a statement or other representa-
tion concerning the goods was a necessary element in an express warranty 
case.
166 By contrast, section 2-313 omits any reference to reliance, instead 
requiring in each instance that the representation be a "part of the basis of 
the bargain"167 between buyer and seller. Was this substitution intended as a 
means of avoiding the requirement that the buyer show reliance in every 
case involving breach of express warranty?168 If buyer reliance on represen-
tations (made by promise, affirmation, description, model, or sample) were 
no longer essential to recovery, then section 2-313 would indeed have 
worked a revolution in the law. The nature of related case law has been de-
scribed, however, as 
manifesting a split of authority between those cases which insist 
upon a showing of reliance and those which reject that requirement. 
The confusion is much deeper. ... [S]ome courts initially state that 
reliance is required, only to later suggest that in fact it is not or may 
not be required. Other courts initially state that reliance is not re-
quired, but proceed to suggest that it is required, either expressly or 
ing too precise is that the statute will have to keep coming in for repairs (and amendment is a 
costly, cumbersome and unsatisfactory process) or else become a dead-letter. 
Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L.J. 1341, 1355 (1948). 
From its inception, the Code was perceived to be "a semi-permanent and infrequently-amended piece of 
legislation." U.C.C. § 1-103 cmt. 1 (2001). In particular, the drafters "intended to make it possible for 
the law embodied in the Uniform Commercial Code to be applied by the courts in the light of unforeseen 
and new circumstances and practices." Id. 
164. For a catalogue of commercial innovations that have arisen since the adoption of the Code, see 
John F. Dolan, Changing Commercial Practices and the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 LOY. L.A. L. 
REV. 579 (1993). 
165. For example, in the course of assessing the ability of paper-based legal requirements to accom-
modate technological change, a number of difficult issues arise. One is whether the electronic message 
can be brought within the definitions of "written" or "writing," see U.C.C. § 1-201(43), and "signed," 
see id. § l-201(37), in order to satisfy the section 2-201 Statute of Frauds requirements. There seems to 
be little consensus on the proper disposition. For a collection of views, see Sharon F. DiPaolo, Note, The 
Application of the Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-201 Statute of Frauds to Electronic Commerce, 
13 J .L. & COM. 143 (1993 ). This uncertainty has led the drafters of amended Article 2 to revise the 
statute to make it medium neutral. Instead of a signed writing, the statute may be satisfied by a signed 
record. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (2003). 
166. See UNIF. SALES ACT § 12 (1906). An affirmation of fact or promise created an express war-
ranty under the Uniform Sales Act only "if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to 
induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon." See id. 
167. u.c.c. § 2-313(2)(b). 
168. What the drafters of the Code intended by the phrase "basis of the bargain" has been a source of 
perpetual confusion. See, e.g., 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
§ 9-5, at 618-28 (5th ed. 2006). 
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through some kind of inducement. Moreover, these cases may very 
well cite each other as authority. 169 
799 
It is not my purpose here to explore what the drafters intended; rather, I 
invoke the confused state of the law on this issue simply to demonstrate that 
oftentimes certainty and predictability cannot always be realized in our legal 
system. 170 Sometimes legislative views cannot plausibly be ascertained in a 
way that cleanly resolves issues of statutory interpretation, many of which 
were unforeseen when the statute was enacted. The choice of rules or their 
application must often make reference to considerations of both fact and 
policy, about which reasonable minds may differ. 
For these reasons, the antipathy towards retroactive legislation cannot 
always be defended as a prudential response to the societal need to protect 
legitimate expectations. Rather, the claim that retroactive application would 
invariably produce injustice or hardship is undermined by the fact that sev-
eral possible outcomes could result from a judicial determination, depend-
ing upon which of multiple contingencies arises. It follows that since there 
is no consistently "right" answer to legal questions, it would be foolish to 
assume that transactors always rely on existing law. 
This is not to suggest that the basic principles of commercial law are not 
fixed and immutable, however. While there may be quibbling, for example, 
about whether the U.C.C. section 2-201 Statute of Frauds has been satisfied 
in a particular case, there can be no doubt that (absent an exception) the 
statute must be satisfied if the contract price in a sales transaction is $500 or 
more. 171 Disputes are clearly resolved by a core body of stable, predictable 
commercial law rules. Yet as to whether people enter into transactions rely-
ing on those rules, empirical evidence suggests that such considerations may 
be less relevant to the day-to-day practices of commercial transactors than 
one might guess. Stewart Macaulay, in a famous and often-cited article, had 
this to say about the real world of commercial practice: 
169. John E. Murray, Jr., "Basis of the Bargain": Transcending Classical Concepts, 66 MINN. L. 
REV. 283, 304 (1982) (footnotes omitted). 
170. The interpretation and application of statutory law have no monopoly on the element of unpre-
dictability. Jerome Frank made the same point with regard to case law more than seventy-five years ago: 
Legal predictability is plainly impossible, if, at the time I do an act, I do so with reference to 
law which, should a lawsuit thereafter arise with reference to my act, may be changed by the 
judge who tries the case. For then the result is that my case is decided according to law which 
was not in existence when I acted and which I, therefore, could not have known, predicted or 
relied on when I acted. 
If, therefore, one has a powerful need to believe in the possibility of anything like exact 
legal predictability, he will find judicial lawmaking intolerable and seek to deny its existence. 
Hence the myth that the judges have no power to change existing law or make new law: 
it is a direct outgrowth of a subjective need for believing in a stable, approximately unalter-
able legal world-in effect, a child's world. 
JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 34-35 (1935). 
171. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (2002). Amended section 2-201 increases the threshold amount of $500 to 
$5,000. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (2005). 
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Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin of 
important long-term continuing business relations. Business people 
often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much 
attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a legal ap-
proach to business relationships. There are business cultures defin-
ing the risks assumed in bargains, and what should be done when 
things go wrong. People perform disadvantageous contracts today 
because often this gains credit that they can draw on in the future. 
People often renegotiate deals that have turned out badly for one or 
both sides. They recognize a range of excuses much broader than 
those accepted in most legal systems. 172 
Thus while perhaps counterintuitive, it nevertheless seems a valid con-
clusion that, if many legal rules are indeterminate and/or there is an ob-
served dichotomy between commercial law and commercial practice, then 
an expectation model of retroactive lawmaking makes little sense. The 
countervailing notion, however, is that a model under which courts and leg-
islatures are free to insist upon retroactivity without restriction contradicts 
the deeply felt and widely held intuition that the content of commercial law 
does matter. Moreover, notwithstanding the dichotomy between law and 
practice, there can be no doubt that this is the case. While some may admit 
to doing what they do without concern for the legal consequences of their 
actions, the same is not true for those who seek the assistance of legal coun-
sel.173 Llewellyn himself recognized the existence of "counsellor's rules"-
rules that, from the counsellor's perspective, were used to shape the transac-
tion. He stated the proposition succinctly: "[T]he counsellor has found that 
there are some solid, settled, clear rules on which he can build; they are 
safe, they are bedrock. But there are not as many of them as one might 
wish."174 If some people can reasonably claim to have relied on one or more 
rules at some point during the life of a commercial transaction, proponents 
of the expectation model would not disturb those settled expectations by 
retroactively applying new rules. Yet given that commercial practice is of-
ten not aligned with reliance on existing law, is there a place for retroactive 
172. Stewart Macaulay, An Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467-68. Macaulay's 
conclusion is supported by other studies. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Practice and 
Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1, 5 (suggesting that "it is a delusion to assume that commercial conduct is 
primarily controlled by what is 'legal"' (citing James J. White, Contract Law in Modem Commercial 
Transactions, An Artifact of Twentieth Century Business Life?, 22 WASHBURN L.J. I, 19 (1982))); 
White, supra, at 2 (conducting an empirical study of chemical and pharmaceutical companies and offer-
ing the ''thesis that contract Jaw is a much less significant determinant of commercial behavior in com-
plex transactions than the typical law student, contracts professor, or lawyer dares believe"). 
173. For the suggestion that those who can claim to have relied on existing law are the wealthy and 
well educated, see Munzer, supra note 145, at 446-47, recognizing that the entrenchment effects of a 
prospective approach to legislation tends ''to favor the wealthy, well-educated, and well-informed who 
were able, in particular by using astute counsel, to consolidate rights in contracts drafted in observance 
of specific rules of contract law." 
174. K.N. Llewellyn, The Modem Approach to Counselling and Advocacy-Especially in Commer-
cial Transactions, 46 COLUM. L. REV. 167, 168 (1946). 
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application of some rules? If so, where should the retroactive/prospective 
line be drawn? 
We might be tempted to propose drawing the dividing line solely on the 
basis of whether or not the new law effects a change to a "bedrock" rule. 
However, while this approach would make sense if all that mattered were 
the evils associated with a disruption of expectations, there are other con-
siderations. One is the risk of legal ossification if the law is frozen simply 
because people might have relied on particular rules when structuring their 
affairs. 175 In addition to expectations alone, the dividing line between retro-
activity and prospectivity should take into account the need for the law to 
keep pace with developing commercial practices and fundamental changes 
in society.176 For this reason, concern for expectations has never been an 
absolute barrier to change resulting from judicial decisions and administra-
tive rulings. 177 There is nothing distinctive about legislative change that 
requires a special set of constraints. 
The nature and magnitude of reliance, even on a bedrock rule, should 
also play a role in the determination of where to draw the line between ret-
roactive and prospective application in setting transition policy. For exam-
ple, it has been suggested that The Legal Tender Cases provide us with a 
compelling situation for the application of precedent in the interests of sta-
bility, even if the price paid for that stability is to endorse wrong deci-
sions.178 It was far too late in the game for the Court to disrupt the country's 
economic system by deciding, even rightly, that the Constitution precluded 
the use of paper money as legal tender. 179 As contexts differ, the nature and 
extent of reliance effects do too, so that every decision need not be the 
same. Moreover, there is often a connection between the probability of ret-
roactive reform and the extent of reasonable reliance. That is, if parties are 
given notice that rules might be altered with retroactive effect, familiar ob-
jections to retroactivity are considerably weakened. One of the best exam-
ples of this point is the set of "don't rely" statutes and constitutional provi-
175. See Eule, supra note 98, at 438 (citing LoN L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 60 (1964)) 
("[l]f every time individuals relied on existing law in arranging their affairs, they were made secure 
against any disruptive alteration of the legal landscape, the result would necessarily be entrenching."); 
Greenblatt, supra note 5, at 567 ("Retroactivity is always an aspect of the broader problem of weighing 
the interests in stability against the constant demands for change inherent in the flux of modem life."). 
176. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
177. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text; see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chev-
ron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225, 2245 (1997) ("In most contexts ... including judicial deci-
sions to reverse or overrule agency precedents, courts rarely take any action to protect the reliance inter-
ests that have been created by the precedent."); Samuel Williston, Change in the law, 69 U.S. L. REV. 
237, 239 (1935) (''To the extent that social needs and mores change, legal principles should change 
[too]."). Moreover, if sheltering expectations were of paramount importance, one would think that, 
unless notice were given in advance of its adoption, no new law should take effect until some reasonable 
period after its promulgation. See Smith, supra note 11, at 420. 
178. See Pierce, supra note 177, at 2244. 
179. See id. ('The Court would be behaving in an extraordinarily irresponsible manner if it overruled 
a precedent in circumstances in which its decision destroyed trillions of dollars of investments made in 
reliance on that precedent."). 
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sions pertaining to corporations. 180 This body of law announces, in advance, 
that all rules governing corporations are subject to retroactive change, which 
is likely to inhibit reliance. Some commentators suggest, therefore, that 
there is a circularity to any analysis based on reliance and expectations: If it 
is probable that laws will apply prospectively, reliance is justified and ex-
pectations are fulfilled; if it is probable that laws will apply retroactively, 
reliance on existing law is hazardous, and expectations, having been shaped 
accordingly, are fulfilled in this case as well. 181 While this observation may 
depend too heavily on potentially faulty premises-that the transition policy 
for all laws will be the same and that there is always minimal reliance on 
laws that are subject to change182-it does lend support to a valid proposi-
tion that may guide transition policy. That proposition is that the inherent 
reasonableness of expectations and reliance on a law in a particular context 
should influence the transition policy associated with that law and context. 
C. Summary: Balancing the Factors 
As has been seen, while many commentators-including courts-have 
regarded a prohibition against the retroactive application of commercial law 
changes as crucial to the protection of rational expectations and the promo-
tion of reliance on existing rules of law, such a prohibition is not always 
warranted by fundamental notions of fairness and efficiency. The first step 
in formulating a new conceptual framework for transition policy is to aban-
don the premise that the law of commercial transactions consists solely of 
bedrock rules that unequivocally guide behavior. Rather, commercial law 
frequently involves indeterminate rules or standards that are abstract and 
open-ended. By incorporating such concepts as commercial reasonableness 
and good faith, the drafters of the Code purposefully designed it so that 
(particularly, for example, in Article 2) the "rule of law" has meaning only 
by reference to the particular setting and circumstances within which the 
commercial transactors do business. The court's role in this schema is not to 
apply rules laid down in advance but to apply the Code so as to give content 
to commercial norms.183 Perhaps the biggest challenge, then, in the pro-
180. See generally Slawson, supra note 4, at 231-33. 
181. See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 19, at 170. 
182. The premise that there is always minimal reliance on laws that are subject to change is faulty, in 
short, because anticipating that laws might change generally is not the same as anticipating "the particu-
lar subject or nature of the change." Eule, supra note 98, at 440 (explaining that even in the area of tax 
legislation where retroactivity is becoming the norm, certain expectations can still be legitimate). Expec-
tations can still be frustrated by a surprising change. See id. 
183. Article 2 requires a court to familiarize itself with relevant commercial practices. It does this 
by utilizing flexible standards, such as commercial reasonableness and good faith, rather than 
rules that purport to capture and solidify prevailing practices and norms. Each dispute be-
tween a seller and buyer is placed in its functional setting where the parties are expected to 
find and prove relevant "habits," i.e., trade usage or practices, as part of the agreement. Under 
these standards, the court is given flexibility (at some cost to certainty and administrability) 
to resolve the new or unique dispute. Moreover, standards are thought to reduce the gap be-
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posed process of deciding whether laws should apply retroactively is to dis-
tinguish rules that can be characterized as bedrock rules from those that 
cannot. More is required, however, because even if the change is to a so-
called bedrock rule, retroactivity could still be optimal if, for example, the 
reform of the law is needed to correct rules that operate unjustly or no 
longer conform to current business practice. Delaying such rules would be 
an unacceptable cost to a strict expectations model, even if applied only to 
bedrock rules. Moreover, if the probable strength of reliance on a rule-
even a bedrock rule-is not great, no significant rational barrier exists as to 
retroactive application of a change to that rule. The aim, then, is to ensure 
that an appropriate balance is struck between security of expectations and 
the need to keep the law responsive to contemporary needs. 
Thus, the process of selecting the appropriate transition policy in each 
instance will require the institution--court or legislature-to consider a 
combination of factors, which are not necessarily to be given equal weight 
in each case, and which should be evaluated in the context of the specific 
statutory change. There should be no one inflexible transition rule applied 
across the board. A rule of general application is inappropriate because op-
timal decisions always involve a very rule-specific assessment of the rele-
vant factors. Instead, legislators in particular should incorporate within the 
statute specific rules governing applicability that flow from consideration of 
the relevant factors. 184 While this proposed jurisprudence of statutory com-
mercial law transitions may not be perceived as "simple" or "clear cut," it is 
both rational and coherent. This Article will now apply the proposed 
framework to several recent changes to U.C.C. Articles 1 and 2. 
tween law and practice and to insure that decisions are practical and responsive to the needs, 
proven in the particular case, of the parties and the relevant business community. 
PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY REPORT 9 ( 1990) (footnotes omitted). Some find no fault 
in this drafting style. See, e.g., Peter A. Alces, Roll Over, Llewellyn?, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 543, 546 
(1993) (arguing that the open-ended drafting style of Article 2 helps guide courts toward the best re-
sults). Others, however, grimly contemplate the prospect of cases with unpredictable outcomes. See, e.g., 
Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 ST AN. L. REV. 
621, 630 (1975) ("[T]he Llewellyn approach seems paradoxically to undermine that very certainty and 
consistency in the law that the Uniform Commercial Code was dedicated to obtaining."). 
184. Theoretically, the transition issue could be allocated to either the judiciary or legislature. The 
advantage, however, of a legislative decision is that it would provide uniformity and eliminate the need 
for parties to engage in before-the-fact speculation about the application of new law. Not only would it 
be preferable for the transition decision to be made by the enacting legislature, but the decision need not 
be the same for all aspects of the new law. Perhaps the best evidence that legislative bodies are capable 
of this type of lawmaking is the recently enacted Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protec-
tion Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C., 12 U.S.C., and 18 U.S.C.). The Act provides, in section 1501, a general effective date 180 days 
from the date of enactment. See id. § 1501. Section 1501 further provides that the Act's amendments are 
applicable only to cases filed on or after the effective date. See id. There are, however, numerous provi-
sions of the Act for which there is an exception to the general effective date. For example, section 1404 
excepts from discharge certain debts relating to securities. See id. § 1404. Section 1404 makes the 
amendment retroactively effective to July 30, 2002. See id. 
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IV. THE PROPOSED FRAMEWORK APPLIED: SOME EXAMPLES 
Several recent changes to U.C.C. Articles 1 and 2 serve as useful illus-
trations of the application of the proposed framework for identifying the 
optimal transition rule for commercial law change. 
A. Example 1: Choice-of-Law 
Revised U.C.C. Article 1 makes significant changes to traditional 
choice-of-law doctrine outside the context of conventional consumer trans-
actions. 185 One such change requires that deference be accorded to the par-
ties' agreement when domestic law is selected,186 except to the extent that 
their choice is contrary to a fundamental policy of the jurisdiction whose 
law would otherwise govern in the absence of a contractual designation. 187 
Under this approach, the key issue ceases to be the existence of a "reason-
able relation" between the transaction and the contractually selected juris-
diction (as in former Article 1) and instead becomes whether the default 
jurisdiction's conflicting policy is "fundamental" or something less. In the 
vast majority of cases there will be no conflict with fundamental policy, so 
the parties' choice will be given effect. 
Under the proposed framework, this new choice-of-law rule should be 
applied retroactively to existing contracts. Consider, for example, the case 
of a contract entered into prior to the effective date of revised Article 1, 
which incorporated a choice-of-law decision that courts would not have 
recognized and protected because of the absence of a reasonable relation 
between the transaction and the contractually designated jurisdiction. Here, 
applying new Article 1, with its expanded menu of choice-of-law options, 
would have the salutary effect of fulfilling, rather than defeating, reasonable 
expectations: Unless it could be demonstrated that a fundamental counter-
vailing policy were implicated, the state law chosen by the parties would be 
applied. 188 
185. If one of the parties to the transaction is a consumer, a choice-of-law agreement is not effective 
to deprive the consumer of the protection of a non-variable consumer protection rule of the jurisdiction 
where either (1) the consumer resides or (2) where both the contract and delivery were made. See U.C.C. 
§ l-30l(e) (2001). 
186. See id. § l-30l(a)(2). If the law chosen is that of a country other than the United States, the 
drafters curiously require that the transaction bear a reasonable relationship to a foreign jurisdiction (but 
not necessarily to the chosen jurisdiction). Id.§ l-30l(c)(2). 
187. See id. § l-30l(f). 
188. The protection of expectations is the historical justification for the retroactive application of 
curative laws. See Smith, supra note 11, at 418 ("[A] retroactive law may give effect to as well as defeat 
reasonable human expectations. Such, indeed, is the peculiar design of that class of retroactive laws 
which is denominated 'curative."'). Revised Article I is by no means the only revised or amended article 
in which one can find changes whose application will protect legitimate expectations. For example, 
amended Article 2 drops the series of sections that define particular mercantile terms. See U.C.C. §§ 2-
319 to -324 (2003). The reason given is that these definitions are "inconsistent with modem commercial 
practices." U.C.C. § 2-319 legislative note and comment (2003). Hence, one assumes that regardless of 
when the contract was formed, the old definitions probably do not reflect the understanding of the par-
ties. 
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B. Example 2: Contract Formation 
One Code section that nearly everyone agrees could use some retooling 
is section 2-207, the so-called battle of the forms provisions. This section 
has produced hundreds of cases and has been the subject of enough aca-
demic commentary to fill a small library. 189 Indeed, section 2-207 was once 
introduced to a continuing legal education audience as follows: 
[O]ne of the problems in this field, which has always been the de-
light of law professors-for all I know the delight of law students-
is the so-called battle of the forms where seller and buyer, each 
dedicated to his own brand of insanity, exchange forms which have 
nothing whatever to do with each other and then ask counsel, "Well, 
where are we?" That was a problem that Professor Llewellyn dearly 
loved, and he put in a long section in Article 2 which has been, gen-
erally, hailed by the academic community as nothing less than 
Magna Charta and, as far as I can tell, generally hailed by members 
of the practicing bar as probably the end of civilization as we know 
it.190 
One reason for the difficulty with section 2-207 is that it attempts to do 
double duty, by addressing both contract formation issues and how to iden-
tify the terms of the resulting contract, if any. Amended Article 2 separates 
these matters. The issue of contract formation is the province of amended 
sections 2-204 and 2-206. Amended section 2-206(3) preserves the policy of 
former section 2-207(1) by providing that "[a] definite and seasonable ex-
pression of acceptance in a record operates as an acceptance even if it con-
tains terms additional to or different from the offer."191 Under amended sec-
tion 2-204, "[a] contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner suf-
ficient to show agreement, including offer and acceptance, conduct by both 
parties which recognizes the existence of a contract, the interaction of elec-
tronic agents, and the interaction of an electronic agent and an individ-
ual."192 
189. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms: 
A Reassessment of§ 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217 (1982); John E. Murray, Jr., Section 2-207 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Another Word About Incipient Unconscionability, 39 U. PITr. L. REV. 597 
(1978); Charles M. Thatcher, Battle of the Forms: Solution by Revision of Section 2-207, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 
237 (1984); Gregory M. Travalio, Clearing the Air After the Battle: Reconciling Fairness and Efficiency 
in a Formal Approach to U.C.C. Section 2-207, 33 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 327 (1983). 
190. PETER F. COOGAN ET AL., ADVANCED ALl-ABA COURSE OF STUDY ON BANKING AND 
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 108 (transcript of ALl-ABA spon-
sored Continuing Legal Education seminar) (remarks by Grant Gilmore). For a similar viewpoint, see 
Thatcher, supra note 189, at 239, stating: "To say that Section 2-207 is no model of simplicity or clarity 
would be to understate the matter considerably. The judicial opinions and scholarly commentary docu-
ment an ongoing struggle to comprehend an unnecessarily complex and opaque statute." 
191. u.c.c. § 2-206(3) (2005). 
192. u.c.c. § 2-204(1). 
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Only after it has been determined that a contract has been formed does 
it become necessary to resort to amended section 2-207, the scope of which 
has been broadened to encompass all sales contracts, not just those that arise 
in a "battle of the forms" setting. Under amended Article 2, in addition to 
those terms that are drawn from the Code itself, the contract now consists of 
those terms that are contained in the records of both parties or to which the 
parties have agreed. Preference is no longer given to either the first or last 
form. 
The obvious indeterminacy of former section 2-207 suggests that it 
would not have been entirely rational for contracting parties to have had an 
ex ante expectation that their deal would be deemed to exist or that its terms 
would be enforced as anticipated. Thus, former section 2-207 could not 
have been categorized as a bedrock rule, reliance on which warranted bol-
stering by protection from retroactive change. Consider, for example, the 
inadequacy of former section 2-207 with respect to "layered" or "rolling" 
contracts. These are agreements viewed as having been reached over time 
rather than at a discrete moment, a concept originating with the Hill v. 
Gateway line of cases. 193 One particularly striking feature of these cases is 
that the courts could not even agree on whether former section 2-207 was 
the proper section to apply. 194 Under the proposed framework, since former 
section 2-207 was "broken" and amended Article 2 would provide the fix, 
its application should not be delayed: In a context where the inadequacies of 
the current statute make reliance impossible, retroactive application of the 
new law will extend benefits that outweigh its costs. 
C. Example 3: Obligations to Remote Purchasers 
Former Article 2 did not, by its own terms, address warranties made di-
rectly to remote (non-privity) purchasers. Amended sections 2-313A and 2-
313B fill this gap. Section 2-313A creates warranty-type liability (called an 
"obligation") where the seller (typically the manufacturer) authorizes a third 
party (typically the retailer) to deliver the warranty to the purchaser at the 
time the goods are purchased.195 Section 2-313B creates an obligation where 
the seller makes a representation, including advertisements, to the general 
193. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). The issue in these cases usually boils 
down to the issue of whether the buyer's failure to return goods (or software) after receipt constitutes 
acceptance of the tenns inside the box. 
194. Compare id. at 1150 (holding 2-207 to be inapplicable and hence additional tenns accompany-
ing goods are accepted by not returning the goods), with Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 
F.2d 91, 105-06 (3rd Cir. 1991) (holding that additional terms accompanying goods become part of 
contract only if incorporated under 2-207). How will "rolling" contracts be decided under amended 
section 2-207? On the one hand, comment 1 emphatically states, 'This section applies to all contracts for 
the sale of goods .... " U.C.C. § 2-207 cmt. 1. The issue would, therefore, be whether opening a box or 
using the goods constitutes the buyer's assent to the seller's terms. On the other hand, comment 5 would 
send a court to the common law. See id. § 2-207 cmt. 5. The amended section may be a step in the right 
direction, but notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, 2-207 is a safe bet to bedevil courts for years to 
come. 
195. U.C.C. § 2-313A. 
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public, and the remote purchaser buys the goods with knowledge of that 
representation. 196 These new sections do not change what most courts are 
already doing, even in cases where the buyer makes no claim for personal 
injury, property damage, or other tort-like harm. 197 Rather, they codify the 
judicial status quo to achieve greater certainty. 
To test whether these new Code sections should operate retroactively 
under the proposed framework, we must recognize the policy justification 
for the continuing erosion of the privity doctrine, a trend which began long 
before the Code was originally drafted. 198 Not only does eliminating a priv-
ity requirement produce a result perceived as just, it also serves the instru-
mentalist ~oal of encouraging remote sellers to respond with safer and better 
products. 1 9 This is especially true if the remote seller has actually taken 
steps to communicate with the remote purchaser. Barkley Clark and Chris-
topher Smith state the policy justification succinctly: 
[l]t makes policy sense to ignore vertical privity as a defense where 
a manufacturer makes an express warranty (normally in writing) 
that is intended to follow the product into the hands of the ultimate 
purchaser, though several links removed in the chain of distribution. 
If affirmations of fact or promises are made regarding the goods, to 
whom are they beamed if not the retail purchaser?200 
As noted earlier, retroactivity is favored by many law and economics schol-
ars because it forces manufacturers to foresee the imposition of expanded 
liability, and it can generally be expected that they will respond by improv-
ing product quality.201 Even if one rejects this instrumentalist vision of dy-
namic efficiency, a fairness theorist might defend the retroactive application 
of sections 2-313A and 2-313B on the basis that the continued recognition 
of a privity requirement in economic loss cases unfairly limits a. manufac-
turer's responsibility for defective products, especially in light of the heavy 
influence of advertising on buyer preferences in the modern marketplace. 
Applying these sections retroactively would at least give existing buyers the 
opportunity to shift their present loss to the party at fault. In this context, the 
proposed framework brings to bear policy considerations suggesting that 
retroactive application is superior: Retroactive application here is more ca-
196. Id.§ 2-3138. 
197. See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, lnc., v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 402-03 (N.Y. 1962) 
(notwithstanding the absence of privily between the manufacturer and consumer, the consumer may 
maintain a breach of warranty action for economic loss based on public advertising and on labels which 
accompanied the goods). 
198. See generally Lindsey R. Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their 
Immediate Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937). 
199. See Richard E. Speidel, Warranty Theory, Economic Loss, and the Privity Requirement: Once 
More Into the Void, 67 B.U. L. REV. 9, 35-57 (1987). 
200. BARKLEY CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES 'l[ 10.02[1] 
(1984). 
201. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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pable of capturing the policy benefits that the drafters had hoped to achieve 
by creating the new sections. 
D. Example 4: Warranty Disclaimers to Consumers 
Like its predecessor, amended U.C.C. section 2-316 permits disclaimers 
of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness. Subsection 2 con-
tinues to be a safe harbor provision, providing sellers with "magic lan-
guage" guarantying the effectiveness of a disclaimer of either warranty.202 
For consumer contracts, however, the incantation has been changed and the 
disclaimer must now be in a record and must be conspicuous.203 To disclaim 
the warranty of merchantability, the following statement is required: ''The 
seller undertakes no responsibility for the quality of the goods except as 
otherwise provided in this contract."204 To disclaim a fitness warranty, the 
required statement must say: "The seller assumes no responsibility that the 
goods will be fit for any particular purpose for which you may be buying 
these goods, except as otherwise provided in the contract."205 
If the new consumer disclaimer rules were to be applied retroactively to 
past transactions, sellers would be most unpleasantly surprised to learn that 
their efforts to define and limit warranty responsibilities-guaranteed to be 
effective under the existing rules at the time-had been rendered a nullity 
by the new rules. Without a bedrock rule such as section 2-316(2), it would 
be impossible for sellers to accurately price their goods because they would 
be unable to stabilize the incidents of doing business. This need for transac-
tional certainty explains why, in addition to the general principles contained 
in 2-316(3), the explicit detailed rules for disclaiming warranties in subsec-
tion (2) have always been part of the Code. While it is certainly true that 
buyers have an interest in protection against defective goods, sellers have an 
equally strong interest in being able to rely on specific statutory instruc-
tions. Accordingly, the quantum and desirability of seller reliance on current 
disclaimer law strongly support only prospective application of these 
rules.206 
202. U.C.C. amended section 2-316(3) continues to allow sellers, in appropriate circumstances, to 
effectively disclaim all implied warranties with expressions like "as is," "with all faults," or similar 
language that is commonly understood to disclaim warranties. U.C.C. § 2-316(3) (2005). In a consumer 
contract, any such disclaimer language must be conspicuously set forth in a record. U.C.C. § 2-316(2). 
203. See id. 
204. U.C.C. § 2-316(2). Current section 2-316(2) allows a disclaimer of merchantability to be effec-
tive if it mentions "merchantability" and, if in writing, is conspicuous. See id. 
205. U.C.C. § 2-316(2). Current section 2-316(2) requires that a fitness disclaimer to be in writing 
and conspicuous. See id. The necessary language is as follows: "There are no warranties that extend 
beyond the description on the face hereof." Id. 
206. For similar reasons, when Article 9 was recently revised, no sensible person would have sug-
gested that the new rules governing perfection of security interests should have immediate retroactive 
effect See U.C.C. § 9-705(c) (2005) (providing that financing statements filed pursuant to former Article 
9 may remain effective until June 30, 2006). 
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CONCLUSION 
A predominantly legislative approach to commercial lawmaking com-
pels the consideration of the appropriate transition option that should apply. 
Although the importance of this issue has been discussed in other contexts, 
it has previously received little attention as a feature of revisions or amend-
ments to commercial law statutes. The salient features of these laws, as well 
as certain unique characteristics of commercial transactions generally, dic-
tate a transition policy that is flexible and responsive to market realities. 
Unlike certain other contexts, in which expectations-based considerations 
may arguably justify strict adherence to a transition policy of prospective 
applicability only, the complexities of commercial transactions often create 
contexts in which absolute protection of expectations and the promotion of 
complete reliance on exiting rules is irrational. Similarly, a transition policy 
of absolute pro-retroactivity, at least arguably desirable in certain other con-
texts, would create an unacceptable and unjustifiable level of disruption in 
commercial practice. Accordingly, a transition policy incorporating both 
retroactive and prospective applicability is appropriate for commercial law. 
The dividing line between the two can be rationally and coherently deline-
ated by examining the nature and magnitude of reliance in specific instances 
and identifying the purpose for the particular legal changes. When the quan-
tum of detrimental reliance of the contracting parties is substantial and the 
new rule is not primarily intended to eliminate socially undesirable prac-
tices, the change should be applied prospectively. Conversely, when the 
benefits to be gained by replacing obsolete or undesirable practices with 
sound ones outweigh the minimal market disruption that may result, retroac-
tive application is optimal. This framework of rational retroactivity, consis-
tently applied, is responsive to both market reality and valid policy consid-
eration. Although there are a wide variety of legal rules to which the 
framework might be applied, it is hoped that transition decisions might be 
enriched by analyses such as those undertaken in this Article. 

